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1 Introduction 
 
This paper reviews the literature that studies the relationship between liquidity and asset 
prices. We review the theoretical literature that predicts how liquidity affects a security’s 
required return and discuss the empirical connection between the two. 
 
Liquidity is a complex concept. Stated simply, liquidity is the ease of trading a security. 
One source of illiquidity is exogenous transaction costs such as brokerage fees, order-
processing costs, or transaction taxes.  Every time a security is traded, the buyer and/or 
seller incurs a transaction cost; in addition, the buyer anticipates further costs upon a 
future sale, and so on, throughout the life of the security. 
 
Another source of illiquidity is demand pressure and inventory risk. Demand pressure 
arises because not all agents are present in the market at all times, which means that if an 
agent needs to sell a security quickly, then the natural buyers may not be immediately 
available. As a result, the seller may sell to a market maker who buys in anticipation of 
being able to later lay off the position. The market maker, being exposed to the risk of 
price changes while he holds the asset in inventory, must be compensated for this risk—a 
compensation that imposes a cost on the seller. 
 
Also, trading a security may be costly because the traders on the other side may have 
private information. For example, the buyer of a stock may worry that a potential seller 
has private information that the company is losing money, and the seller may be afraid 
that the buyer has private information that the company is about to take off. Then, trading 
with an informed counterparty will end up with a loss. In addition to private information 
about the fundamentals of the security, agents can also have private information about 
order flow. For instance, if a trading desk knows that a hedge fund needs to liquidate a 
large position and that this liquidation will depress prices, then the trading desk can sell 
early at relatively high prices and buy back later at lower prices. 
 
Another source of illiquidity is the difficulty of locating a counterparty who is willing to 
trade a particular security, or a large quantity of a given security.  Further, once a 
counterparty is located, the agents must negotiate the price in a less than perfectly 
competitive environment since alternative trading partners are not immediately available. 
This search friction is particularly relevant in over-the-counter (OTC) markets in which 
there is no central marketplace. A searching trader incurs financing costs or opportunity 
costs as long as his trade is delayed, and, further, he may need to give price concessions 
in the negotiation with the counterparty that he eventually finds. Alternatively, he may 
trade quickly with a dealer and bear illiquidity cost. In general, a trader faces a tradeoff 
between search and quick trading at a discount.  
 
These costs of illiquidity should affect securities prices if investors require compensation 
for bearing them.  In addition, because liquidity varies over time, risk-averse investors 
may require a compensation for being exposed to liquidity risk. These effects of liquidity 
on asset prices are important. Investors need to know them in designing their investment 
strategies. And if liquidity costs and risks affect the required return by investors, they 
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affect corporations’ cost of capital and, hence, the allocation of the economy's real 
resources. 
 
Liquidity has wide ranging effects on financial markets. As our survey shows 
theoretically and empirically, liquidity can explain the cross-section of assets with 
different liquidity, after controlling for other assets’ characteristics such as risk, and the 
time series relationship between liquidity and securities returns.  Liquidity helps explain 
why certain hard-to-trade securities are relatively cheap, the pricing of stocks and 
corporate bonds, the return on hedge funds, and the valuation of closed-end funds.  It 
follows that liquidity can help explain a number of puzzles, such as why equities 
commanding high required returns (the equity premium puzzle), why liquid risk-free 
treasuries have low required returns (the risk-free rate puzzle), and why small stocks that 
are typically illiquid earn high returns (the small firm effect). 
 
The liquidity literature is vast. In this survey we restrict our attention to papers that link 
liquidity to securities’ required return, that is, to the literature on liquidity and asset 
pricing. Hence, we will not survey the large literature on market microstructure, which 
studies trading mechanisms and the origins of illiquidity, e.g., in the form of bid-ask 
spreads or market impact. Surveys of market microstructure include O’Hara (1995), 
Madhavan (2000), Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2002), and Harris (2003). Further, Easley 
and O’Hara (2003) survey papers on microstructure and the relationship to asset pricing, 
and Cochrane (2005) surveys recent NBER papers on liquidity and asset pricing. We 
apologize that we cannot survey every paper on liquidity and asset pricing; the literature 
is simply too large and too rapidly expanding. Our final apology is that our own papers 
are probably among the least overlooked; in our defense, these are the papers that we 
know best, and they ask the questions that originally drew us into this field. 
 
In what follows, the theory of liquidity-based asset pricing is surveyed in Section 2 and 
the empirical evidence is reviewed in Section 3. The theory section proceeds from basic 
models with exogenous (expected) holding periods to ones incorporating additional 
elements of risk and endogenous holding periods. The empirical section reviews the 
evidence on the liquidity premium for stocks, bonds, and other financial assets.  
      
 
2 Theory 
 
In this section, we first relate the theory of liquidity and asset pricing to the standard 
theory of asset pricing in frictionless markets. We then show how liquidity is priced in 
the most basic model of liquidity, where securities have exogenous trading costs and 
identical, risk-neutral investors have exogenous trading horizons (Section 2.2). We then 
extend this basic model to take into account clientele effects (Section 2.3), time-varying 
trading costs and liquidity risk (Section 2.4), uncertain trading horizons (Section 2.5) and  
endogenous trading horizons (Section 2.6). We also briefly review the sources of 
illiquidity and consider models of asset pricing with endogenous illiquidity (Sections 2.7-
2.8). 
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2.1 Liquidity and Standard Asset Pricing Theory 
 
To study how liquidity affects asset pricing, it is useful to place it in the context of 
standard asset pricing theory. Readers may, however, choose to skip directly to Section 
2.2, where we start discussing the actual theories of liquidity and asset pricing. 
 
2.1.1 Background: Standard Asset Pricing 
 
Standard asset pricing1 is based on the assumption of frictionless (or, perfectly liquid) 
markets, where every security can be traded at no cost all of the time, and agents take 
prices as given. The assumption of frictionless markets is combined with one of the 
following three concepts: no arbitrage, agent optimality, and equilibrium. 
 
No arbitrage means that one cannot make money in one state of nature without paying 
money in at least one other state of nature. In a frictionless market, the assumption of no 
arbitrage is essentially equivalent to the existence of a stochastic discount factor  such 
that the price process  of any security with dividend process  satisfies 
tm
tp td
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += +++
t
t
tttt m
mdpEp 111 . (2.1) 
Equation (2.1) is the main building block of standard asset pricing theory. It can also be 
derived from agent optimality: if an insatiable investor trades in a frictionless market, his 
optimal portfolio choice problem only has a solution in the absence of arbitrage― 
otherwise he will make an arbitrarily large profit and consume an arbitrarily large 
amount. Further, the first-order condition to the investor’s problem has the form (2.1). In 
particular, if the investor’s preferences are represented by an additively separable utility 
function  for a consumption process , then ( )∑s sst cuE c ( )ttt cum ′=  is the marginal 
utility of consumption.   
 
Finally, in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and agents  with 
separable utility functions , (2.1) is satisfied with
Ii ,,1K=
iu ( )ttt cum λ′= ,  where  is 
the utility function of the representative investor and 
∑= i itit uu λλ
iλ  are the Pareto weights that 
depend on the agents' endowments. 
 
2.1.2 On the Impossibility of Frictionless Markets 
 
One could argue that, if there were a friction that led to large costs for agents, then there 
would be an institutional response that would profit by alleviating this friction. 
According to this view, there cannot be any (important) frictions left in equilibrium. 
 
Alleviating frictions is costly, however, and the institutions which alleviate frictions may 
be able to earn rents. For instance, setting up a market requires computers, trading 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Duffie (1996) or Cochrane (2001). 
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systems, clearing operations, risk and operational controls, legal documentation, 
marketing, information and communication systems, and so on. Hence, if frictions did not 
affect prices then the institutions that alleviated the frictions would not be compensated 
for doing so. Therefore, no one would have an incentive to alleviate frictions, and, hence, 
markets cannot be frictionless. 
 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980a) use a similar argument to rule out informationally 
efficient markets: market prices cannot fully reveal all relevant information since, if they 
did, no one would have an incentive to spend resources gathering information in the first 
place. Hence, investors who collect information must be rewarded through superior 
investment performance. Therefore, information differences across agents is an 
equilibrium phenomenon, and this is another source of illiquidity.   
 
There must be an “equilibrium level of disequilibrium,” that is, an equilibrium level of 
illiquidity: the market must be illiquid enough to compensate liquidity providers (or 
information gatherers), and not so illiquid that it is profitable for new liquidity providers 
to enter. 
 
2.1.3 Liquidity and Asset Pricing: The Point of Departure 
 
If markets are not frictionless, that is, if markets are beset by some form of illiquidity, 
then the main building blocks of standard asset pricing are shaken. First, the equilibrium 
aggregation of individual utility functions to a representative investor may not apply. 
Second, individual investor optimality may not imply that (2.1) holds with ( )ttt cum ′=  at 
all times and for all securities.  This is because an investor need not be "marginal" on a 
security if trading frictions make it suboptimal to trade it. Indeed, Luttmer (1996, 1999) 
shows that trading costs can help explain the empirical disconnect between consumption 
and asset returns. Hence, illiquidity implies that we cannot easily derive the stochastic 
discount factor from consumption, much less from aggregate consumption. Then, what 
determines asset pricing? 
 
Some people might argue that the cornerstone of standard asset pricing is the mere 
existence of a stochastic discount factor, not necessarily its relation to consumption. 
Indeed, powerful results—such as the theory of derivative pricing—follow from the 
simple and almost self-evident premise of no arbitrage. It is, however, important to 
recognize that the standard no-arbitrage pricing theory relies not only on the absence of 
arbitrage, but also on the assumption of frictionless markets. 
 
To see why the assumption of frictionless markets is crucial, consider the basic principle 
of standard asset pricing: securities, portfolios, or trading strategies with the same cash 
flows must have the same price. This simple principle is based on the insight that, if 
securities with identical cash flows had different prices, then an investor could buy—with 
no trading costs—the cheaper security and sell—with no trading costs—the more 
expensive security, and, hence, realize an immediate arbitrage profit at no risk. Another 
way to see that standard asset pricing implies that securities with the same cash flows 
must have the same price is to iterate (2.1) to get 
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which shows that the price  only depends on the pricing kernel and the cash flows . tp d
 
With trading costs, however, this principle need not apply. Indeed, with transaction costs, 
securities with the same cash flows can have different prices without introducing 
arbitrage opportunities. 
 
Do real-world securities with the same cash flows have the same price? Perhaps 
surprisingly, the answer is “no,” certainly not always. As discussed in Section 3, on-the-
run (i.e. newly issued) Treasuries often trade at lower yields than (almost) identical off-
the-run Treasuries, and Treasury bills and notes of the same cash flows trade at different 
prices (Amihud and Mendelson (1991)). Shares that are restricted from trade for two 
years trade at an average discount of about 30% relative to shares of the same company 
with identical dividends that can be traded freely (Silber (1991)). Chinese “restricted 
institutional shares,” which can be traded only privately, trade at a discount of about 80% 
relative to exchange-traded shares in the same company (Chen and Xiong (2001)). 
Options that cannot be traded over their life trade at large discounts relative to identical 
tradable options (Brenner, Eldor, and Hauser (2001)). The put-call parity is sometimes 
violated when it is difficult to sell short, implying that a stock trades at a higher price 
than a synthetic stock created in the option market (Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw 
(2004)). Further, in so-called “negative stub value” situations, a security can trade at a 
lower price than another security, which has strictly lower cash flows (e.g. Lamont and 
Thaler (2003)). 
 
The existence of securities with identical cash flows and different prices implies that 
there does not exist a stochastic discount factor  that prices all securities, that is, there 
does not exist an  such that (2.2) holds for all securities. 
m
m
 
Another important difference between standard asset pricing and liquidity asset pricing is 
that the latter sometimes relaxes the assumption of price-taking behavior. Indeed, if 
prices are affected by the nature of the trading activity, then agents may take this into 
account. For instance, if an agent is so large that his trades significantly affect prices, he 
will take this into account, or if agents trade in a bilateral over-the-counter market, then 
prices are privately negotiated. Further, the liquidity literature relaxes the assumptions 
that all investors have the same information and that all investors are present in the 
market at all times. 
 
2.1.4 Liquidity and Asset Pricing: Where it will Take Us (in This Paper) 
 
The prices of securities are determined by the general equilibrium of the economy. 
Hence, the price of a security is some function of the security's cash flow, the cash flows 
of other securities, the utility functions of all agents, and the agents’ endowments. In an 
economy with frictions, the price depends additionally on the security’s liquidity and the 
liquidity of all other securities. 
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One strength of a frictionless economy is that a security’s cash flows and the pricing 
kernel are sufficient statistics for the pricing operation described by Equation (2.1). This 
means that the pricing kernel summarizes all the needed information contained in utility 
functions, endowments, correlations with other securities, etc. 
 
In some liquidity models, there still exists a pricing kernel  such that (2.1) holds. In 
this case, illiquidity affects , but the pricing of securities can still be summarized using 
a pricing kernel. This is the case if certain agents can trade all securities all of the time 
without costs. For instance, in the models of demand pressure and inventory risk that 
follow Grossman and Miller (1988), competitive market makers can trade all securities at 
no cost (whereas customers can only trade when they arrive in the market). Garleanu, 
Pedersen, and Poteshman (2004) show explicitly how m depends on demand pressure in a 
multi-asset model. The empirical analysis of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is (implicitly) 
based on an assumption that there exists an m that depends on an measure of aggregate 
liquidity (but this does not rely on an explicit theory). 
m
m
 
In other models of liquidity, however, there is no pricing kernel such that (2.1) applies. 
For instance, in transaction-cost-based models, securities with the same dividend streams 
have different prices if they have different transaction costs. Hence, a security’s 
transaction cost not only affects the nature of the equilibrium, it is a fundamental attribute 
of the security. 
 
When there does not exist a pricing kernel, then the computation of equilibrium asset 
prices becomes more difficult. Indeed, the general equilibrium prices with illiquidity may 
depend on the fundamental parameters in a complicated way that does not have a 
closed-form expression. Nevertheless, we can derive explicit prices under certain special 
assumptions such as risk neutrality, some structure of trading horizons, partial 
equilibrium, normally distributed dividends, and so on. While the difficulty of general 
equilibrium with frictions often forces us to use such special assumptions to get closed-
form results, we can still gain important insights into the main principles of how liquidity 
affects asset prices. 
 
 
2.2 Basic Model of Liquidity and Asset Prices 
 
It is important to understand the effect of liquidity on asset prices in the most basic 
model. Hence, we consider first a simple model in which securities are illiquid due to 
exogenous trading costs, and investors are risk neutral and have exogenous trading 
horizons. This model is a special case of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
 
The basic idea is as follows. A risk-neutral investor who buys a security and expects to 
pay transaction costs when selling it, will take into account this when valuing the 
security. She knows that the buyer will also do that, and so on. Consequently, the 
investor will have to consider, in her valuation, the entire future stream of transaction 
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costs that will be paid on the security. Then, the price discount due to illiquidity is the 
present value of the expected stream of transaction costs through its lifetime.  
 
Translating this into the required return on the security which is costly to trade, we obtain 
that the required return is the return that would be required on a similar security which is 
perfectly liquid, plus the expected trading cost per period, i.e., the product of the 
probability of trading by the transaction cost. 
 
We consider a simple overlapping generations (OLG) economy in discrete time 
.  There is a perfectly liquid riskless security and agents can 
borrow and lend at an exogenous risk-free real return of 
{ KK ,2,1,0,1,2, −−∈t }
ff rR +=1 . Further, there are I  
illiquid securities indexed by  with a total of  shares of security i . At time 
, security  pays a dividend of , has an ex-dividend share price of , and has an 
illiquidity cost of . The illiquidity cost  is modeled simply as the per-share 
cost of selling security . Hence, agents can buy at  but must sell at . We 
assume (
Ii ,,1K= iS
t i itd
i
tP
ii
t CC = iC
i itP
ii
t −CP
for now) that  are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean itd
id . 
 
Agents are risk neutral and have a discount rate of fR
1 , and the market prices are 
determined in a competitive equilibrium. In a competitive equilibrium, agents choose 
consumption and portfolios so as to maximize their expected utility taking prices as 
given, and prices are determined such that markets clear. We are looking for a stationary 
equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium with constant prices iP . 
 
To fix ideas, suppose first that agents live for two periods and new agents are born every 
period. If an agent buys a share of security  in the first period of his life, then he must 
sell the share in the following period, realizing an expected revenue of 
i
iii CPd −+ . The 
agent will buy an arbitrary large number if shares of the price is lower than the expected 
discounted revenue ( )f iii R CPd −+ , or short an arbitrarily large amount if the price is 
higher. Hence, we must have 
 ( )
f
iii
i
R
CPdP −+=        , (2.3) 
 
implying that 
 ( )
f
ii
i
r
CdP −=         . (2.4) 
 
 8
We see that the price is equal to the present value of all future expected dividends 
minus the present value of all future transaction costs . This is intuitive. The investor 
foresees receiving a dividend and paying a transaction cost next period, and he must sell 
to another investor who foresees the following dividend and transaction cost, and so on. 
id  
iC
 
Alternatively, we can express this result by looking at the effect of liquidity on the 
required gross return defined as 
 
( ) iii iii PdP PdErE =−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += 1:  . (2.5) 
 
We see that the required return is the risk free return increased by the relative transaction 
cost: 
( ) iifi PCrrE +=  . (2.6) 
 
Equivalently, the liquidity-adjusted expected return is the risk free rate, 
 
f
i
ii
r
P
Cd =−  . (2.7) 
 
We can easily generalize this result to an economy in which an agent lives for more than 
one period. Specifically, suppose that, in any period, an agent must exit the market with 
some probability μ . This exit event captures the notion of a “liquidity shock” to the 
agent, for instance, a sudden need for cash. Then, at any time t, the equilibrium price 
must be the present value of dividends until the random exit time T  plus the liquidation 
value, that is, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ∑
+=
−−
T
ts
ii
tTf
i
ttsft
i CP
R
d
R
EP
1
11 )  (2.8) 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−= ∑ ∑∞
+=
∞
+=
−
+−
−
+−
1 1
11 11
ts ts
ii
tsf
ts
i
ttsf
ts
t CP
R
d
R
E μμμ  (2.9) 
 
( )( )iiif CPdr −++= μμ1   . (2.10) 
 
Rearranging, this implies the following 
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Proposition 1  In equilibrium, the price of any security  is given by i
 
f
ii
i
r
CdP μ−=  (2.11) 
 
or, equivalently, the required return on security  is i
 
( ) iifi PCrrE μ+=  . (2.12) 
 
Intuitively, (2.11) shows that the price is the expected present value of all future 
dividends, minus the expected present value of all future transaction costs, taking into 
account the expected trading frequency μ . The equivalent equation (2.12) shows that the 
required return is the risk free return plus the per-period percentage transaction cost, that 
is, the relative transaction cost i
i
P
C  weighted by the trading frequencyμ . 
 
2.3 Clientele Effects 
 
Suppose that investors differ in the likelihood that they need to trade in any period, or in 
their expected holding period. For example, some investors expect a greater likelihood of 
a liquidity shock that will force them to liquidate, or a greater likelihood of arrival of a 
good investment opportunity that will make them want to liquidate their investment and 
switch to another. Consequently, each investor considers differently the impact of 
transaction costs on the return that he requires. Since investors require compensation at 
least for their expected per-period trading costs, a frequently-trading investor requires a 
higher return than does an infrequently-trading one. A long-term investor who can 
depreciate the trading cost over a longer (expected) holding period requires lower per-
period return than does the short-term investor.  Long-term investors can thus outbid the 
short-term investors on all assets. However, investors have limited resources and cannot 
buy all assets, and therefore they specialize in investments that are most beneficial for 
them. While all investors prefer assets with low transaction costs, these assets are most 
valued by short-term investors who incur transaction costs most frequently. Long-term 
investors then opt for assets in which they have the greatest advantage—those that are 
most costly to trade. These illiquid assets are shunned by the frequent traders and are 
heavily discounted by them.  As a result, long-term investors, who bear the costs less 
frequently, earn rent in holding these assets which exceeds their expected transaction 
costs. Put differently, the liquidity premium on these assets will be greater than their 
expected trading costs. And, in equilibrium, liquid assets are held by frequently-trading 
investors while the illiquid assets are held by investors with long expected holding 
period. 
 
This idea is presented by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who study the effect of having 
different types of investors with different expected holding periods. In particular, suppose 
 10
that an agent of type j ,  receives a liquidity shock with probability Jj ,,1K= jμ  that 
forces him to sell and leave the market. We number the agent types such that type 1 has 
the highest risk of a liquidity shock, type 2 has the second highest, and so on, 
.  Also, we number the securities such that security 1 is most liquid, 
security 2 is second most liquid, and so on, 
Jμμμ ≥≥≥ K21
I
I
d
C
d
C
d
C ≤≤≤ K2
2
1
1
 .2   
 
Agents of type  are the natural buyers of illiquid securities because they have the 
longest expected holding period and, hence, the smallest per-period transaction costs. 
Hence, without borrowing constraints, the equilibrium is that type- agents buy all of the 
illiquid assets and the model reduces to the single-type model of Section 2.2. In this case, 
transaction costs would matter little as the long-term investors can amortize the trading 
costs over a long time period. Further, without borrowing constraints, investors could 
achieve a long holding period by postponing liquidation of assets when facing a cash 
need and instead financing consumption by borrowing. Hence, borrowing frictions are 
important for market liquidity to affect prices. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005a) 
for a discussion of the interaction between market liquidity and borrowing constraints 
(so-called funding liquidity). In reality, unconstrained borrowing is infeasible. Instead, 
we make here a convenient (extreme) assumption that agents have limited wealth and 
cannot borrow. Specifically, agents of type 
J
J
j  are born with a wealth of , and there is 
a mass of agents of type 
jW
jm j  at any time. 
 
The optimal trading strategy of agent j  is to invest all his wealth in securities with the 
highest liquidity-adjusted return, 
 
i
iji
i P
Cd μ−max   , (2.13) 
 
and the agent is indifferent among the securities with this maximal liquidity-adjusted 
return. Note that the liquidity-adjusted return depends both on the security and the agent 
type. 
 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that the equilibrium has the following form: The 
agents with the shortest holding period, i.e., type 1, hold the riskless security and the 
illiquid securities with the lowest trading cost, i.e. securities where  is a 
nonnegative integer. (If   then this means that type 1 agents hold no illiquid 
securities.) Agents with the next shortest holding period hold a portfolio of securities 
with the next lowest trading costs,  and so on.  Hence, agents of type 
1,,1 iK 1i
01 =i
21 ,, ii K j  holds 
securities  where .  The equilibrium cutoff levels, 
 depend on the total wealth of each type of investors.  Specifically, type 
jj ii ,,1 K− Iiii J =≤≤≤≤ K210
Jii ,,1 K j  
                                                          
2 Of course, what matters is the transaction cost relative to the fundamental value. In fact, one could use 
“stock splits” to achieve constant expected dividends for all securities.  
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investors must invest all their wealth in securities , and total demand must equal 
supply. 
jj ii ,,1 K−
 
Securities with low trading costs are priced such that type 1 agents are indifferent 
between holding these securities or the risk free asset. Hence, these securities must offer 
a liquidity adjusted return equal to the risk free rate, 
 
i
ii
f
P
Cdr
1μ−=   , (2.14) 
 
that is, 
f
ii
i
r
CdP
1μ−=  (2.15) 
for . 1,,1 ii K=
 
With these prices, agents of type 2 earn a return higher than the risk free rate because 
they have a longer holding period and, hence, pay the trading cost less often. To see this, 
consider the liquidity-adjusted return of a type-2 agent for a security { }1,,1 ii K∈ : 
 
ff
ii
ii
i
ii
rr
Cd
Cd
P
Cd >−
−=− 1
22
μ
μμ   ,           (2.16) 
 
since . Note that this return is increasing in 12 μμ < i
i
d
C  since the larger is the trading 
cost, the larger is type-2 agents’ comparative advantage. Hence, the largest liquidity-
adjusted return is that of security .  We denote this return by 1i
 
1
2
2
11
: i
ii
P
Cdr μ−=∗   . (2.17) 
 
To make type 2 agents hold securities , these securities must offer a liquidity-
adjusted return of 
21 ,, iii K=
 
i
ii
P
Cdr
2
2 : μ−=∗       , (2.18) 
 
that is, 
2
1
∗
−=
r
CdP
ii
i μ  (2.19) 
 
for . 21 ,, ii K
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We can continue this iterative process. In general, a security that is held in equilibrium by 
type- j  investors has a price of 
 
j
iji
i
r
CdP ∗
−= μ  (2.20) 
 
where jr∗  is type- j  investors’ required liquidity-adjusted return, which is determined by 
 
1
11
: −
−− −=∗ j
jj
i
iji
j
P
Cdr μ      . (2.21) 
 
Clearly, investors with long horizon earn higher liquidity-adjusted returns (or “rents”), 
that is, . jrr ∗∗ ≤≤K1
 
Competition among investors implies that the gross return on any security is determined 
by the minimum required return across possible investors: 
 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +== ∗ i
i
jj
ji
i
i
P
Cr
P
drE μmin        (2.22) 
 
Hence, the expected gross return i
i
P
d  is the minimum of a finite number of increasing 
linear functions of the relative transaction cost i
i
P
C .  Since the minimum operator 
preserves monotonicity and concavity, we have 
 
Proposition 2 
(i) In equilibrium, securities with higher transaction costs are allocated to agents 
with longer (or identical) investment horizons.  
(ii)  If type j  agents are marginal investors for security i , then security i  has an 
expected gross return of  
 
( ) ( ) iijfjfi PCrrrrE μ+−+= ∗   (2.23) 
which is the sum of the risk free rate fr  , investor j 's “rent” ( )fj rr −∗ , and 
his amortized relative trading cost i
i
j
P
Cμ . 
(iii) The expected gross return ( )irE  is an increasing and concave function of the 
relative transaction cost i
i
P
C . 
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Note that liquid securities are allocated in equilibrium to agents with short investment 
horizons. Since these agents are the least capable of dealing with illiquidity, they earn 
lower rents. Therefore, the liquidity premium ( ) iijfj PCrr μ+−∗  for relatively liquid 
securities arise mostly from the amortized spread i
i
j
P
Cμ . 
 
Agents with long investment horizons, however, can earn rents because patient capital is 
in short supply. Hence, according to this clientele theory, the liquidity premium 
( ) iijfj PCrr μ+−∗  for relatively illiquid securities arise largely from the rents ( )fj rr −∗  
and less from the amortized spread because the relevant  is small.jμ 3
 
2.4 Time-Varying Transaction Costs and Liquidity Risk 
 
Liquidity varies over time.4 This means that investors are uncertain what transactions 
cost they will incur in the future when they need to sell an asset. Further, since liquidity 
affects the level of prices, liquidity fluctuations can affect the asset price volatility itself. 
For both of these reasons, liquidity fluctuations constitute a new type of risk that 
augments the fundamental cash-flow risk. This section presents a model of the effect of a 
security's liquidity risk on its expected return, thus extending the standard Sharpe-
Lintner-Mossin effect of risk on expected return. The exposition follows Acharya and 
Pedersen's (2005) dynamic OLG model of the effect of variations in liquidity on asset 
prices under risk aversion. The model gives rise to a liquidity-adjusted capital asset 
pricing model that shows how liquidity risk is captured by three liquidity betas, and how 
shocks to liquidity affect current prices and future expected returns. A static asset pricing 
model with uncertain trading costs is presented by Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000). 
 
To make the model tractable, we assume that agents live for only one period (that is, 
1=μ ). Generation t  consists of  agents, indexed by , who live for two periods, t  and 
. Agent n of generation t  has an endowment at time t  and no other sources of 
income, trades in periods  and 
n n
1+t
t 1+t , and derives utility from consumption at time 1+t . 
He has constant absolute risk aversion  so that his preferences are represented by the 
expected utility function 
nA( )1exp +−− tntE xA , where  is his consumption at time 1+tx 1+t . 
 
                                                          
3 See Kane (1994) for an alternative proof of the clientele effect. In a static mode without clientelle effects, 
Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000) show that short-lived securities’ required return can be convex in 
trading costs.   
4 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) offer a model that explains the variations over time in liquidity, linking it to 
variations in the funding conditions of market makers. 
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Uncertainty about the illiquidity cost is what generates the liquidity risk in this model. 
Specifically, we assume that  and  are autoregressive processes of order one, that is: itd
i
tC
 ( ) ttDt dddd ερ +−+= −1  (2.24) 
 
and ( ) ttCt CCCC ηρ +−+= −1     , (2.25) 
 
where d , IC +ℜ∈  are positive real vectors, , Dρ [ ]1,0∈Cρ , and ( )tt ηε ,  is an 
independent identically distributed normal process. 
 
We are interested in how an asset’s expected gross return, 
 
1
1
−+=
−
i
t
i
t
i
ti
t P
Pdr     , (2.26) 
 
depends on its relative illiquidity cost, 
 
i
t
i
ti
t P
Cc
1−
=     , (2.27) 
 
on the market return, 
 ( )
1
1
−+= ∑
∑
−i
i
t
i
i
i
t
i
t
i
M
t PS
PdS
r     , (2.28) 
 
and on the relative market illiquidity, 
 
∑
∑
−
=
i
i
t
i
i
i
t
i
M
t PS
CS
c
1
  . (2.29) 
 
To determine the equilibrium prices, consider first an economy with the same agents in 
which asset  has a dividend of  and no illiquidity cost. In this imagined 
economy, standard results imply that the CAPM holds (Markowitz (1952); Sharpe 
(1964); Lintner (1965); Mossin (1966)). We claim that the equilibrium prices in the 
original economy with frictions are the same as those of the imagined economy. This 
follows from two facts: (i) the net return on a long position is the same in both 
economies; and, (ii) all investors in the imagined economy hold a long position in the 
market portfolio, and a (long or short) position in the risk-free asset. Hence, an investor’s 
equilibrium return in the frictionless economy is feasible in the original economy, and is 
i it
i
t CD −
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also optimal, since positive transactions costs imply that a short position has a worse 
payoff than minus the payoff of a long position. 
 
These arguments show that the CAPM in the imagined frictionless economy translates 
into a CAPM in net returns for the original economy with illiquidity costs. Rewriting the 
one-beta CAPM in net returns in terms of gross returns, we get a liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM for gross returns. To capture this, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) introduce three 
liquidity betas , , and , which complement the standard market beta 1Lβ 2Lβ 3Lβ β : 
 
Proposition 3 (Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM) In the unique linear equilibrium, the 
conditional expected net return of security  is i
 
( ) ( )( )MtMtt
M
t
M
t
i
t
i
tt
t
fi
t
i
tt cr
crcrrcrE
11
1111
11 var
,cov
++
++++
++ −
−−+=− λ     , (2.30) 
 
where ( )fMtMttt rcrE −−= ++ 11λ  is the risk premium. Equivalently, the conditional expected 
gross return is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )32111 LtLtLtttittfitt cErrE ββββλ −−+++= ++    , (2.31) 
 
where 
 ( )( )MtMtt
M
t
i
tt
t cr
rr
11
11
var
,cov
++
++
−=β     , (2.32) 
 ( )( )MtMtt
M
t
i
ttL
t cr
cc
11
111
var
,cov
++
++
−=β     , (2.33) 
 ( )( )MtMtt
M
t
i
ttL
t cr
cr
11
112
var
,cov
++
++
−=β     , (2.34) 
and 
 ( )( )MtMtt
M
t
i
ttL
t cr
rc
11
113
var
,cov
++
++
−=β     . (2.35) 
 
Equation (2.31) is simple and natural. It states that the required excess return is the 
expected relative illiquidity cost, ( )itt cE 1+  as in the basic model above, plus four betas (or 
covariances) times the risk premium. These four betas depend on the asset’s payoff and 
liquidity risks. As in the standard CAPM, the required return on an asset increases 
linearly with the market beta, that is, the covariance between the asset’s return and the 
market return. This model yields three additional effects which could be regarded as three 
forms of liquidity risks. 
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The first liquidity beta  is positive for most securities due to commonality in 
liquidity.
1Lβ
5 The model implies that expected return increases with the covariance between 
the asset’s illiquidity and the market illiquidity, because investors want to be 
compensated for holding a security that becomes illiquid when the market in general 
becomes illiquid. 
 
The second liquidity beta , which measures the exposure of asset i to marketwide 
illiquidity, is usually negative
2Lβ
6 in part because a rise in market illiquidity reduces asset 
values.  This beta affects required returns negatively because investors are willing to 
accept a lower return on an asset with a high return in times of market illiquidity. 
Consequently, the more negative is the exposure of the asset to marker illiquidity, the 
greater is the required return.  
 
The third liquidity beta  is also negative for most stocks.3Lβ 7 This liquidity beta has a 
negative sign in the pricing model, meaning that the required return is higher if the 
sensitivity of the security’s illiquidity to market condition is more negative. The negative 
effect stems from the willingness of investors to accept a lower expected return on a 
security that is liquid in a down market. When the market declines, investors are poor and 
the ability to sell easily is especially valuable. Hence, an investor is willing to accept a 
discounted return on stocks with low illiquidity costs in states of poor market return. 
 
Empirically, liquidity is persistent over time,8 meaning that if a market is illiquid today, 
then it is more likely to not fully recover next month. Mathematically, this means that 
. 0>Cρ
 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that persistence of liquidity implies that liquidity 
predicts future returns (Equation (2.36) below) and co-moves with contemporaneous 
returns (Equation (2.37) below). Intuitively, as stated in Amihud (2002), a high illiquidity 
today predicts a high expected illiquidity next period, implying a high required return, 
which is achieved by lowering current prices. This result relies on the realistic 
assumption that cash flow shocks and shocks to the trading costs are not too highly 
correlated.  
 
Proposition 4 Assuming that liquidity is persistent and certain technical conditions are 
satisfied for a portfolio , then an increase in illiquidity implies that the required return 
increases: 
q
 
( ) 01 >−∂∂ + fqttqt rrEC  (2.36) 
                                                          
5 See evidence in Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), Chordia, Roll and Subramaniam (2002). 
6 See evidence in Amihud (2002). 
7 See evidence in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Chordia, Sarkar and Subramaniam (2005). 
8 See evidence in Amihud (2002). 
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and contemporaneous returns are low 
 ( ) 0,cov 1 <− qtqtt rc      . (2.37) 
 
2.5 Uncertain Trading Horizons and Liquidity Risk 
 
In the previous section, we considered the risk that it suddenly becomes very costly to 
liquidate a portfolio. Another way of considering liquidity risk is to focus on the trading 
horizon, while keeping the trading costs constant. 
 
The net-of-transaction-cost rate of return (per unit of time) of an asset is increasing with 
the holding period since the transaction cost is depreciated over a longer period and thus 
its per-period effect is smaller. If the holding period becomes stochastic due to liquidity 
shocks, the net return becomes random as well even if both the gross return and the 
transaction costs are deterministic. In the basic model of Section 2.2, this risk is ignored 
since agents are assumed risk neutral. If agents are risk averse, then this liquidity-induced 
risk will be priced. Huang (2003) analyzes this problem, assuming two console bonds 
that are identical except that one is liquid and the other is illiquid, i.e., it incurs 
proportional transaction costs. Investors are risk averse (with CARA utility function) and 
have a constant income stream. Each investor is hit by a negative “liquidity shock” with a 
Poisson arrival rate and, when this happens, the investor must liquidate his securities and 
exit. Importantly, there is a constraint on short selling and on borrowing against future 
income. Thus, the transaction costs that the investor incurs upon liquidation negatively 
affect his immediate consumption and he cannot alleviate this effect by borrowing. This 
effect would be particularly costly (in terms of utility of consumption) if the investor has 
just recently acquired the illiquid asset, in which case the return that has accumulated on 
it is small relative to the liquidation costs. Huang shows that in equilibrium, the illiquid 
security whose net return becomes stochastic will have a premium over the liquid 
security which exceeds the magnitude of expected transaction costs, reflecting the 
liquidity-induced risk premium. This can help explain why the return premium on illiquid 
stocks, estimated in empirical studies, is so large relative to expected per-period 
transaction costs. 
 
Vayanos (2004) considers a model in which investors’ risk of needing to liquidate is time 
varying and shows that the liquidity premium—that is, the return compensation for 
illiquidity—is also time varying. Indeed, when investors have a high likelihood of 
needing to sell, the liquidity premium is high. Further, Vayanos (2004) links the risk of 
needing to liquidate to the market volatility. 
 
2.6 Endogenous Trading Horizons 
 
The models considered so far have assumed that the trading horizon was exogenous, that 
is, μ  was exogenous. In many cases, however, trading horizons are the outcome of 
optimal investor behavior, and investors can trade off cost and benefits of delaying 
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trades. To capture this effect, Constantinides (1986) studies a continuous-time model in 
which an investor with constant relative risk aversion holds a risk free and a risky 
security, the latter having proportional exogenous trading cost.9 Absent trading costs, 
theory suggests that the investor will hold a fixed ratio of the assets and trade 
continuously to balance his portfolio in response to the risky asset’s price changes. With 
trading costs, the investor faces a tradeoff: frequent portfolio rebalancing when the 
risky/riskless assets ratio deviates from its optimal value entails high trading costs, while 
refraining from rebalancing renders the portfolio suboptimal and imposes a utility cost. 
The solution is setting a boundary around (above and below) the optimal asset ratio 
within which there is no trading, and when the ratio is outside of the boundary, the 
investor transacts to the nearest boundary.10 The width of the no-trade region increases in 
the risky security’s trading costs, and thus higher trading costs lead to less trading, less 
demand for the risky asset, and a higher utility loss for the investor. The liquidity 
premium on the risky asset with trading costs is then defined as the decrease in its 
expected return that would leave the investor indifferent between this asset and an 
identical asset with no trading costs. Using calibrated parameter values, Constantinides 
finds that the liquidity premium in terms of per-annum return is much smaller than the 
trading cost. This is because investors in his model can largely alleviate the cost by 
reduced trading and because the utility costs of not trading are small. 
 
Vayanos (1998) constructs a general equilibrium model with endogenous trading 
horizons. Overlapping generations of investors trade and consume continuously over 
their deterministic lifespan and have access to a perfectly liquid riskless asset and to a 
general number of risky assets that are costly to trade. In equilibrium, investors buy the 
risky assets when born, and slowly sell them as they become older and more risk averse. 
A calibration of the model finds that the effects of transaction costs are small because 
life-cycle is the only trading motive (similar to Constantinides (1986)). Further, Vayanos 
shows that a general equilibrium model with endogenous horizons can lead to surprising 
results. For instance, in certain special cases, transaction costs can actually raise an 
asset's price. This can happen because, while trading costs make investors buy fewer 
shares, they induce them to hold the shares for longer periods, which can raise the total 
asset demand. 
 
Some of the observed evidence in the market is consistent with these models’ predictions. 
We observe that in the last decade there has been a significant decline in trading costs in 
U.S. stock markets, partly due to reducing the minimum tick from $1/8 to $1/16 and then 
to a penny. At the same time, stock turnover in the New York Stock Exchange has risen 
from 54% in 1994 to 99% in 2004.11 This relationship is predicted, e.g., by 
                                                          
9 See also Liu (2004) who determine the optimal trading strategy for an investor with constant absolute risk aversion 
and many independent securities with both fixed and proportional costs. 
10 Constantinides (1986) assumes that the investor continuously consumes a constant proportion of riskless wealth. 
Davis and Norman (1990) prove formally that the optimal investment indeed is bang-bang as assumed by 
Constantinides (1986) and derive the optimal consumption, which is, however, not a constant proportional of riskless 
wealth. While the investor behavior considered by Constantinides (1986) is therefore not fully optimal, the order of 
magnitude of Constantinides's calibration results has not been questioned. 
 
11 Source: NYSE Fact Book 2004. 
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Constantinides’s model, where the width of the no-trade region increases in trading costs. 
However, the liquidity premium predicted by these models is low relative to the 
empirical results documented in Section 3, reflecting the models’ assumptions that the 
only reason for trading is portfolio rebalancing where the parameters of the risky asset’s 
process are constant.12 Further, due to this minor need for trade, the annual turnover 
predicted, e.g., by Vayanos is around 3%, which is quite low relative to observed 
turnover. 
 
In the real world, many investors have larger needs to trade in spite of the significant 
trading costs. A simple reduced-form way of capturing a large trading need is to use the 
models of Sections 2.2-2.5 with a trading intensity calibrated to match the observed 
volume. Further, the following studies introduce additional motives for trade in models 
with endogenous trading horizon and, consequently, obtain that the effect of trading costs 
on the liquidity premium is greater. Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) consider an 
equilibrium with two completely “opposite” agents who have perfectly negatively 
correlated endowment risk. The agents face fixed per-trade trading costs so they refrain 
from trading when the security position is within certain boundaries and, when the 
position reaches a boundary, they trade to the optimal position somewhere in the middle 
of the no-trade region (as oppose to trading to nearest boundary as is as the case with 
proportional trading costs). Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) find that the liquidity 
premium can be large when the investors have high-frequency trading needs. Also, the 
partial equilibrium approach of Constantinides (1986) has been extended by Jang, Koo, 
Liu, and Loewenstein (2005) who introduce a time-varying investment opportunity set, 
and Lynch and Tan (2005) who consider return predictability, wealth shocks, and state-
dependent transaction costs.13 These motivations for trading in excess of 
Constantinides’s (1986) portfolio rebalancing motive increase the resulting trading 
frequency and the impact of transaction costs on price. These authors show through 
numerical calibration that the liquidity premium can be large for certain parameters that 
they find realistic. 
 
Vayanos and Vila (1999) study an OLG model with a risky asset with proportional 
trading costs and a liquid riskless asset in fixed supply, thus endogenizing the riskless 
interest rate. If the risky asset has a higher trading cost then the risk-free asset becomes a 
more attractive alternative. Therefore, the equilibrium price of the risk-free asset is 
increasing (i.e., the risk-free interest rate is decreasing) in the trading cost of the risky 
asset. Heaton and Lucas (1996) solve an equilibrium model of incomplete risk sharing 
numerically and find that trading costs increase the equity premium and lower the 
riskfree rate. Heaton and Lucas (1996) find sizeable effects only if trading costs are large 
or the quantity of traded assets is small. 
 
                                                          
12 Novy-Marx (2005) describes how liquidity can appear to be priced (as in the empirical literature) even when its not, 
because liquidity can proxy for unobserved risk factors. 
13  See also Balduzzi and Lynch (1999). 
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2.7 Brief Aside: Sources of Illiquidity 
 
As discussed in the introduction, illiquidity can arise from exogenous trading costs, 
private information, inventory risk for market makers, and search problems. While the 
illiquidity related to exogenous costs and search are straightforward, we briefly review 
how information and inventory problems can also lead to illiquidity. In Section 2.8 we 
discuss how these sources of illiquidity affect security prices.  
 
2.7.1 Illiquidity Deriving from Private Information 
 
Certain investors or corporate insiders can have superior information (or information 
processing ability) about the fundamental value of a security. This creates an adverse 
selection problem: informed traders with bad news are likely to sell, and informed traders 
with good news have an incentive to buy (Akerlof (1970)). 
 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980b) show that information asymmetries are fundamental to 
market equilibrium for, if all information were contained in prices, no one has an 
incentive to gather information in the first place. Hence, they consider a noisy rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) in which investors are competitive price takers who learn 
from prices. In equilibrium, some investors refrain from collecting information while 
others incur cost in gathering information and get compensated in the form of superior 
expected investment performance such that the two groups of investors have the same 
overall expected utility. The literature on how information is revealed through prices in 
REE also includes Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), and others. 
 
Investors with private information have an incentive to strategically take into account the 
price effect of their trades, and market makers strategically protect themselves against 
informed traders. Bagehot (1971) proposes that the market maker gains from trading with 
uninformed liquidity traders and loses money to informed traders. This gives rise to the 
bid-ask spread, which is necessary to compensate the market maker for his losses to the 
informed traders. Copeland and Galai (1983) model the quoting decision of a profit-
maximizing market maker, with profit defined as the difference between the gain from 
liquidity traders and the loss to informed traders. Copeland and Galai view the quoted bid 
and ask prices as strike prices on two free options with a very short expiration period 
written by the market maker to the informed trader. The ask and bid prices are, 
respectively, the strike (exercise) prices of the call and of the put, straddling the current 
security’s price.  The model’s implication is that increased uncertainty (volatility) widens 
the spread, which concurs with the empirical evidence.  
 
A standard way of modeling the market maker’s strategy when trading with informed 
investors is to assume that the market maker is competitive and risk neutral with a 
discount rate equal to the risk-free rate, which is normalized to zero. Such a competitive 
market maker sets the price  at time t according to  tp
 ( )ttt OFvEp ,ℑ=     , (2.38) 
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where  is the fundamental value, v tℑ  is the public information, and  is the order 
flow at time t. Hence, the market maker sets a price equal to his best estimate of the 
asset’s fundamental value, given what he learns from the order flow. With this price-
setting principle, execution prices follow a martingale. 
tOF
 
This general modeling approach is applied in the context of various market structures. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) consider a market structure in which competitive market 
makers must quote binding bid and ask prices and investors arrive sequentially and can 
decide whether to buy one share at the ask, sell one share at the bid, or refrain from 
trading. In this case, the bid is the expected value of the fundamental given that the next 
trade is a sell order, and similarly for the ask, leading to the following "regret free" 
prices: 
 ( )sellvEbid tt ,ℑ=     , (2.39) 
and ( )buyvEask tt ,ℑ=     . (2.40) 
 
The quoted bid price reflects the risk that a seller is informed of bad news, and the ask 
reflects the risk that a buyer is informed of good news. If the market maker were sure that 
the counterparty is informed, she would not trade at all since as long as the informed 
trader wishes to sell, the price is too high. What makes the market maker willing to trade 
is the possibility that the counterparty is uninformed, and it may gain by selling to him at 
a “high”—ask—price or buying from him at a “low”—bid—price. Thus, the market 
maker gains from trading with uninformed traders and looses to informed ones. Since in a 
competitive market the market maker ends up with zero profit, the gains of the informed 
traders are at the expense of the uninformed ones who need to trade. Clearly, the model 
implies a bid-ask spread (bid<ask) which is greater if the probability of trading with 
informed traders is larger.  
 
Kyle (1985) considers a market where an informed and an uninformed “noise” trader 
each submit a market order for an asset, and the market maker sets the price depending 
on the aggregate order flow such that he ends up with zero gain (as is the case in a 
competitive market).  A large demand will make the market maker raise the price since it 
may reflect demand by an informed investor who knows that the asset value is high. The 
noise trader submits an exogenous normally distributed order u , while the informed 
trader optimally decides on his order x given his signal about the value v, where x is 
constrained by the informed trader’s knowledge that a large order will reveal his 
information to the market maker and will cause the price to be set closer to v, leaving him 
with a smaller per-unit gain.14 Kyle shows that there exists a linear equilibrium in which 
the market maker sets the price as 
 ( ) ( )tttttttt xupxuvEp ++=+ℑ= − λ1,     , (2.41) 
                                                          
14 In this model, the informed trader is a monopolist on the information on v and he thus acts as a monopolist who 
considers the consequences of his action on price. 
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where λ describes the price change per unit of net order flow, that is, the market impact, 
which is a measure of illiquidity. Kyle shows that λ increases in the variance about v, i.e., 
in the extent of asymmetry in information, and it declines in the variance of u, the 
uninformed investors’ order flow.15 Thus, both the bid-ask spread and the market impact 
are measures of market illiquidity that can result from information asymmetry. 
Mendelson and Tunca (2004) extend the Kyle (1985) model to the case of endogenous 
liquidity trading. Like Kyle (1985) and the other papers briefly reviewed in this 
subsection, they do not address how information asymmetry affects required return.  
 
Whereas the above-mentioned papers deal with the effects of private information about 
fundamental news, there is also a more recent literature that recognizes the importance of 
private information about order flow; for example, a trader might be using his knowledge 
about someone else moving a large block of shares. This literature includes Madrigal 
(1996) who considers non-fundamental speculation, Attari, Mello, and Ruckes (2005) 
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005b) who study predatory trading (trading the 
exploits or induces other traders need to liquidate a position),16 Vayanos (2001) and Cao, 
Evans, and Lyons (2003) who consider strategic trading due to risk sharing, and 
Gallmeyer, Hollifield, and Seppi (2004) who study uncertainty about the preferences of 
potential counterparties.  
 
2.7.2 Illiquidity Deriving from Inventory Risk  
 
A fundamental source of illiquidity is the fragmentation of investors and markets due to 
the fact that not all investors are present in the same market all of the time. For instance, 
a seller may arrive to the market at a time when a natural buyer is not present. This gap 
between the seller and buyer is bridged by market makers who provide immediacy 
through their continuous presence in the market and thus enable continuous trading by 
any trader who so wishes. In particular, the market maker can buy from the seller and 
later resell to the buyer. However, the market maker faces a risk of fundamental price 
changes in the meantime and must be compensated for this risk. This has been pointed 
out by Stoll (1978). Garman (1976) introduces a model with a monopolist market maker 
whose quoted prices affect the intensity of arrival of buys and sellers. If quoted prices are 
constant, the market maker will be surely ruined. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho 
and Stoll (1981) resolve this problem by having the quoted bid-ask prices depend on the 
market maker’s inventory of the traded security. Amihud and Mendelson assume a 
market maker who constrains his inventory position (due to capital constraint and risk) 
and manages inventory to avoid the constraints, and Ho and Stoll assume a risk-averse 
market maker who manages inventory to reduce his risk exposure. Demand-pressure 
models with competitive market makers are considered by Ho and Stoll (1983) and 
                                                          
15 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) further show how private information leads to endogenous concentration of trade since 
all traders prefer to trade at the time of highest liquidity, Kyle (1989) considers the case of imperfect competition 
between market makers, and Easley and O’Hara (1987) study the information content of trade side and its consequent 
effect on prices. 
16 See also Pritsker (2003) 
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Grossman and Miller (1988). Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005a) relate variations in 
liquidity over time and cross-sectionally to market makers’ capital constraints. 
 
 
2.8 Asset Pricing with Endogenous Illiquidity   
 
In Section 2.7 we described how illiquidity can arise endogenously due to various 
fundamental frictions. We are interested in determining how these frictions ultimately 
affect asset prices. One approach is to take the endogenously derived liquidity costs and 
“plug them into” the asset pricing models with exogenous trading costs (Sections 2.2-
2.6). As we show below, we can sometimes get additional insights by considering asset 
pricing directly in a model of endogenous illiquidity.  
 
2.8.1 Private Information and the Required Return 
 
The effect of information asymmetry on the required return is studied in dynamic REE 
models by Wang (1993, 1994) and in a strategic model by Garleanu and Pedersen (2004). 
Wang (1993) considers a dynamic infinite-horizon model in which all investors observe a 
dividend process and the corresponding stock price, but only a fraction of the investors 
observe the dividend process’s stochastic growth rate ∏. The price does not fully reveal 
∏ since the supply of shares is random. Wang shows that if there is a larger fraction of 
less-informed investors who do not observe ∏, then the required return is higher. One 
reason for this is that when dividends increase, less-informed investors increase their 
expectations of dividend growth, thus pushing prices up. This process raises the cor-
relation of prices and dividends, thus raising total return volatility, which reduces 
consumption smoothing and risk sharing and increases the average risk premium.17
 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2004) consider a model in which a finite number of agents trade 
repeatedly by submitting market or limit orders. Each period, one agent may receive a 
signal about the next dividend, and potentially a “liquidity shock”. Garleanu and 
Pedersen show that, if agents are symmetric ex ante, then future bid-ask spreads due to 
private information are not a direct trading cost. That is, their present value does not 
directly reduce the price—unlike the case of exogenous trading costs. This result obtains 
because, in expectation, the future losses an agent will incur when trading due to liquidity 
reasons are balanced by the gains he will make when trading based on information. If the 
agents differ ex ante, though, in that some agents are more likely to make liquidity trades 
than others, then the marginal investor does not break even on average and her expected 
net trading losses augment the required return. Importantly, the adverse-selection 
problems lead to an indirect cost associated with allocation inefficiencies caused by 
trading-decision distortions. This indirect allocation cost (further) increases the required 
return. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Recent static models of asymmetric information and asset prices include Easley and O'Hara (2004) and O'Hara 
(2003).  
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2.8.2 Illiquidity due to Inventory-Risk and Demand Pressure 
 
From the investor’s viewpoint, illiquidity due to demand pressure and inventory-related 
costs can be treated as exogenous illiquidity cost, whose effect on asset prices are as 
derived in Sections 2.2-2.6. The smaller the inventory position that the market maker is 
willing to assume due to limits on his capital and due to the risk of the security traded 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1980), or the greater the price volatility of the security traded 
(Ho and Stoll, 1981), the greater is the bid-ask spread that the market maker sets. In 
addition, variations in demand pressure that cause variations in the market maker 
inventory change the prices at which he is willing to trade.  These are short-term, 
transitory effects of inventory on prices, but the permanent effect on prices and expected 
return flows through the effect on trading costs. For example, in market systems with 
better capacity to absorb inventory shocks, the models would predict smaller illiquidity 
costs and consequently there would be smaller price discount due to illiquidity. 
 
2.8.3 Search, Bargaining, and Limits on Trading 
 
Liquidity problems often play a role in “over the counter” (OTC) markets, that is, when 
there is no centralized market and investors trade bilaterally, for instance over the phone. 
In such markets, illiquidity arises because of search and bargaining problems. For 
instance, when a trader needs to sell her position, she must search for a counterparty 
willing to buy, and, once a potential counterparty is located, the trader must negotiate the 
price—a negotiation that reflects each trader’s outside option to find other counterparties. 
Further, due to the bilateral trading in OTC markets, intermediaries can have market 
power, allowing them to earn fees, which translate into trading costs for investors. 
Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2003a and 2003b) model such search and bargaining 
features and study how these sources of illiquidity affect asset prices. They find that, 
under certain conditions, search frictions increase the liquidity premium (i.e., lower 
prices) and increase bid-ask spreads. Further, higher bargaining power to buyers leads to 
lower prices. Also, Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2003b) link volatility to liquidity and 
thus to prices. 
 
Weill (2002) and Vayanos and Wang (2002) extend the model of Duffie, Garleanu and 
Pedersen to the case of multiple illiquid securities and show, among other things, that 
search frictions lead to cross-sectional differences in the liquidity premium. In particular, 
securities with larger float (or supply) of securities are predicted to have less severe 
search problems and correspondingly lower liquidity premia. Lagos (2005) shows that 
search frictions can help explain the risk-free rate and equity-premium puzzles.  
 
Vayanos and Wang (2002) further show how search externalities can lead to 
concentration of trade in one security among several substitutes. Duffie, Garleanu, and 
Pedersen (2002) consider a model in which shortsellers must search for lendable 
securities, and must negotiate the lending fee with the lender, thus capturing the real-
world OTC institution for shortselling. They show how the lending fee initially increases 
the value of the security. Vayanos and Weill (2005) develop a multi-asset model in which 
both the spot markets (for buying and selling securities) and the securities lending 
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markets (for borrowing shares to shortsell) are OTC search markets. In equilibrium, one 
security is “special”: it is liquid, has a high price, and has a large lending fee. Boudoukh 
and Whitelaw (1993) show that it can in the issuer’s interest to maintain segmented 
markets in which one security is special. 
  
Hopenhayn and Werner (1996) consider a matching model in which certain assets have 
payoffs that are “non-verifiable” to uninformed agents. When uninformed agents are 
matched, they do not trade assets with non-verifiable payoffs and, therefore, these assets 
become less liquid and have a higher expected return. 
 
Longstaff (1995) considers the liquidity premium in a partial equilibrium model with 
limited access to counterparties using a different approach. A hypothetical investor can 
perfectly predict the future price movements of a security over a certain time period but 
cannot trade the security during this period.  If the investor could time the sale of the 
asset optimally, it would be worth more than if he has to hold it until the end of the 
period.  The difference—the value of the foregone option to sell the asset optimally—is 
an upper bound on the value of liquidity.  The value of liquidity can also be likened then 
to the payoff from an option on the maximum value of a security whose exercise (strike) 
price is the value of the security when the liquidity restriction expires. This option is also 
in the money, meaning that there is a positive liquidity discount. Longstaff then obtains 
that the maximum value of this option when the restriction period is 2 years and volatility 
is 30% is 38.6% of the asset value—quite close to the discount observed for restricted 
stock (see Section 3.2.4 below).  It is of course questionable whether investors can 
perfectly time their trades, therefore the price discount in this model is the upper bound 
on the cost of illiquidity. But the method can be used for any strategy that investors wish 
to apply based on observables, and then the cost of illiquidity is the opportunity cost of 
foregoing this strategy. 
 
Longstaff (2001) considers a continuous-time model in which an investor must limit his 
trading intensity, thus capturing the idea that investors cannot unwind a position 
immediately. Consequently, the investor must avoid shorting or taking a leveraged 
positions, i.e., his investment in the risky asset is limited (the model is in partial 
equilibrium). Longstaff derives the optimal portfolio choice under this constraint, and 
shows numerically that the implied liquidity premium can be substantial. This trading 
friction is also used by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005b) who study the asset pricing 
effects of illiquidity deriving from predatory trading. 
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3 Empirical Evidence 
 
Conceptually, the first research question to be addressed by empirical studies of liquidity 
and asset pricing is regarding the existence of a liquidity effect.  As discussed in Section 
2.1.3, the null hypothesis of standard asset pricing theory is that assets with the same cash 
flow d should have the same price.  To test the existence of a liquidity effect, the 
researcher identifies two assets 1 and 2 with cash flows d1 and d2 and different measures 
of liquidity L1 and L2 and examines the asset prices, P1 and P2, at the same point in time.  
If asset 1 is more liquid, i.e., L1>L2, but the assets have the same cash flow, d1=d2, 
standard asset pricing theory implies the null hypothesis P1=P2, whereas liquidity-based 
asset pricing implies the alternative hypothesis P1>P2.  In some cases, asset 1 is a 
synthetic security designed to replicate the cash flow pattern d2 of asset 2, so the price P1 
is only an estimate of the price of the synthetic security, typically based on theoretical 
considerations.  Surely, the pricing differences between assets may also be estimated by 
looking at differences in their expected returns or yields, assuming the same cash flows 
or controlling for differences in other determinants of expected returns.  In some cases, 
the researcher examines a family of assets with different cash flows and different levels 
of liquidity.  Then, the analysis includes control variables that account for the differences 
that can be explained by the different cash flows, and then tests whether the price 
differential which is unexplained by the control variables is significantly related to 
differences in liquidity.   
 
As we discuss below, the empirical evidence supports the existence of a liquidity effect, 
leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis.  This leads to the second research question:  
What is the magnitude and functional form of the liquidity effect?  This can be studied 
either cross-sectionally, comparing prices for a family of assets with different levels of 
liquidity (using adequate controls), or in a time-series study, where the liquidity of a 
given security changes over time and the researcher studies the price change associated 
with the liquidity change. 
 
The empirical work on liquidity and asset pricing often combines the two research 
questions, focusing on the effects of liquidity on a family of financial instruments which 
vary in their liquidity.  Accordingly, we classify the empirical literature based on the 
financial instruments used to test and estimate the liquidity effect.  We start by examining 
the relationship between liquidity and asset prices for stocks, where the liquidity effect 
has been studied extensively.  Within this class, we distinguish between cross-section 
tests and studies of the effect of changes in liquidity over time, examine separately 
studies that focus on the effects of liquidity risk (rather than the level of liquidity) on 
asset prices, and conclude with the effects of trading restrictions on stock prices.  We 
then review empirical work that studies the effect of liquidity on bond yields, 
distinguishing between U.S. Treasury securities and corporate bonds, which pose the 
additional challenge of disentangling the effects of liquidity and default risk.  We then 
review the literature on liquidity and asset prices for other financial instruments—
options, index-linked bonds, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), hedge funds and 
closed-end funds.    
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We consider first the challenges of choosing a liquidity measure L. 
 
3.1 Liquidity Measures: Empirical Issues       
 
As pointed out in Section 2, liquidity has a many facets. A major problem in estimating 
the effect of liquidity on asset prices or returns is how to measure liquidity since there is 
hardly a single measure that captures all of its aspects.  In addition, measures used in 
empirical studies are constrained by data availability.  High-frequency data that enable 
the estimation of liquidity from the actual sequence of trades and quotes became 
available in the U.S. only recently and are thus available only for a relatively short period 
of time.  Further, studies of the effect of liquidity on expected stock returns use ex-post or 
realized returns, whose variance around the expected return is high.  Consequently, 
researchers need a large amount of data – long time series – to increase the power of their 
tests.  Given the short duration of high-frequency data, this poses a problem.  Researchers 
need then to find substitute measures of liquidity using low-frequency data, such as daily 
return data and perhaps trading volume.  In stock markets outside the U.S., high 
frequency data are hardly available, and the researcher then needs to estimate liquidity 
from daily return data, and, if available, from volume data as well.  The empirical studies 
we survey thus employ various measures of liquidity, obtained from both high frequency 
and daily data.  Neither is a perfect measure of liquidity, but most of these measures are 
highly  positively correlated. 
 
These problems in the measurement of liquidity reduce the power of tests of the effect of 
liquidity on securities pricing.  Any liquidity measure used clearly measures liquidity 
with an error, because (i) a single measure cannot capture all the different dimensions of 
liquidity, (ii) the empirically-derived measure is a noisy estimate of the true parameter, 
and (iii) the use of low-frequency data to create the estimates increases the measurement 
noise.  It is well known that errors in the variables bias downward (towards zero) the 
estimated regression coefficients.  This means that the effect of liquidity is hard to detect 
even when it exists and, further, this could aggrevate potential omitted-variable problems.  
 
 
3.2 Equity Markets  
 
3.2.1 Cross-Section Tests 
 
The effect of liquidity on asset pricing was first studied by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986a), whose model produces two major empirical predictions (see Sections 2.2-2.3 
above): 
 
1. Expected asset return is an increasing function of illiquidity costs, and  
2. The relationship is concave due to the clientele effect (Section 2.3):  In 
equilibrium, less liquid assets are allocated to investors with longer holding 
periods, which mitigates the compensation that they require for the costs of 
illiquidity. 
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These predictions are tested using stock returns over the period 1961-1980 and data on 
quoted bid-ask spreads for 1960-1979.  The relative spread is the ratio of the dollar 
spread to the stock price, where the spread is the average of the beginning- and end-of-
year end-of-day quotes, collected from Fitch quote sheets for NYSE and AMEX stocks. 
Every year, stocks are grouped into 49 (7x7) portfolios sorted on previous-year relative 
spread and within that, sorted on previously-estimated beta, and monthly return is 
calculated for each portfolio.  The estimation is done by a pooled time-series and cross-
section GLS regression which employs an estimation of the variance-covariance matrix 
of the 49 portfolios.  
 
The estimation model is a regression of the portfolio monthly return on the portfolios’ 
previously-estimated betas and previous-year average relative spreads.  The spread effect 
is estimated in a piece-wise linear fashion, using dummy variables for the seven spread 
groups and the mean spread for each portfolio in each year.  Thus, the regression 
explicitly accounts for the effect of the spread on (a) the level of the portfolio’s average 
return and on (b) the slope of the return-spread relationship.  The model’s predictions are 
that (1) the portfolio return increases with the bid-ask spread, which is the main 
prediction, and (2) the return-spread slope decreases in the bid-ask spread, reflecting 
concavity.   
 
The results support both predictions.  The alternative hypotheses – that average return is 
not increasing in the spread, and that the slope is not decreasing in the spread – are 
rejected.  The following illustrates the effect of the spread.  From spread-portfolio 1 to 
spread-portfolio 4, the average spread increases by 0.659% and the monthly stock return 
increases by 0.242% (roughly 3% per annum), a ratio of 0.37.  From portfolio 4 to 7, the 
spread rises by 2.063% and the average return rises by 0.439%, a ratio of 0.21.  That is, 
the return-spread relationship for low-spread portfolios is nearly twice as high as it is for 
high-spread portfolios.  
 
In addition, the model estimates the effect of the firm’s size (capitalization) on stock 
return.  The hypothesis is that if size reflects an aspect of liquidity – it is less costly to 
trade stocks of larger companies – then the size effect should weaken once the equation 
includes the bid-ask spread, which is a more direct measure of liquidity costs.  Indeed, 
the bid-ask spread is known to be negatively related to firm size, as shown by Stoll and 
Whaley (1983) and others.  The results support this prediction.  The negative effect of 
size is weakened – it becomes insignificant – once the spread is included in the equation. 
Note, however, that the results could accommodate the size effect in addition to the effect 
of the bid-ask spread since the relative spread alone does not capture all aspects of 
liquidity. 
 
A convenient summary of the results is provided in Amihud and Mendelson (1986b). 
Given the concave effect of the spread on expected return, the following model is 
estimated: 
 
Rj = 0.0065 + 0.0010βj + 0.0021ln(Sj) , 
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Where Rj is the monthly stock portfolio return in excess of the 90-day Treasury bill rate, 
βj is the systematic risk, estimated from data in the preceding period, and Sj is the relative 
bid-ask spread in the preceding year.  All coefficients are statistically significant.  By this 
estimation, the return difference between a stock with a 1.5% spread and a stock with 1% 
spread (and the same β) is 0.087% per month or roughly 1% per year.  The return 
difference is greater – 0.15% per month (or 1.8% annually) for a stock with 1% spread 
compared to a same-risk stock with 0.5% spread.  
 
The estimated return-spread relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between stocks’ excess monthly returns and bid-ask spreads for a 
given level of systematic risk.  Based on Amihud and Mendelson (1986b).       
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Amihud and Mendelson (1989) further estimate the return-spread relationship, 
accounting also for the effect of volatility.  Constantinides (1986, see Section 2.6) shows 
that the effect of trading costs may be confounded with that of risk.  While in 
Constantinides’ (1986) model, trading costs have only second-order effect on asset 
returns, expected return rises with volatility because higher volatility induces more 
frequent trading, which makes investors incur higher trading costs.  Amihud and 
Mendelson thus add to the estimation model, which includes the portfolio’s beta and 
relative spread, the standard deviation of market-model residuals (unsystematic risk).  
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The results show that while the bid-ask spread effect remains positive and significant, the 
effect of the unsystematic risk is generally negative but insignificantly different from 
zero. 
 
For Nasdaq National Market System stocks, bid-ask spreads at the end of the day are 
available on the CRSP daily database, which facilitates the study of the return-spread 
relationship with more accurate data that in Amihud and Mendelson (1986b).  Also, 
while on the NYSE and AMEX individual investors could trade through limit orders that 
had priority over the specialist’s quotes and thus avoid the cost of the spread (though 
incurring the costs of risk and delay), on Nasdaq trading was done mostly through market 
makers, and investors had to incur the cost of the spread.18  Consequently, the estimated 
effect of the bid-ask spread is expected to be stronger when using Nasdaq stocks.  This is 
indeed the finding by Eleswarapu (1997), who estimates a model where the stock return 
is regressed on the stock’s beta, relative spread, and log(size).  The estimation is 
performed for individual stocks employing the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method.  The only 
consistently significant effect is that of the relative spread, whose coefficient is positive 
and significant for both January and non-January months, whereas the coefficient of 
log(size) is negative and insignificant and that of beta is positive and significant only in 
January.19  The liquidity effect in non-January months is inconsistent with an earlier 
finding by Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) that liquidity affects stock returns only in 
January.  These authors replicate the Amihud-Mendelson study but employ the Fama-
Macbeth method in the cross-section estimation and obtain that the bid-ask spread effect 
is significant only in the month of January but not in non-January months or in the year 
as a whole, and the size effect is never significant.  Then, employing a looser data 
requirement that allows more small firms into the sample results again in the spread 
effect being significant only in the month of January but insignificant for the entire year, 
whereas the size effect is negative and significant both in January and in the entire year 
(but neither variable is significant in non-January months; the issue of the seasonality in 
the liquidity effect is revisited by Amihud (2002) and by Hasbrouck (2005), see below). 
 
A finer measure of illiquidity is used by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996): Kyle’s 
(1985) λ (see Section 2.7), estimated from intraday trade and quote data.  Brennan et al. 
estimate λ by regressing the trade-by-trade price change, Δpt, on the signed transaction 
size, qt.  The slope coefficient from this regression20 is Kyle’s λ which measures the price 
impact of a unit of trade size, being larger for less liquid stock.21  The regression model 
also includes Dt -Dt-1, where Dt=1 for a buy transaction and Dt=–1 for a sell transaction. 
The coefficient of this differential, ψ, reflects the fixed cost of trading that is unrelated to 
                                                          
18 Until 1997, customer limit orders were not displayed in Nasdaq and were not incorporated in market-
makers’ quotes even when the limit price was better than the best displayed quote.   
19 The separation between January and non-January is due to the “January Effect:” Small-firm stocks tend 
to outperform the market only in January. See Keim (1983).   
20 For these regressions, the authors use two models, one by Glosten and Harris (1988) and the other by 
Hasbrouck (1991) which mainly differ in the specification of the order quantity: The latter uses residual 
transaction size obtained from a regression model.  The results from the two models are qualitatively 
similar. 
21 In Kyle (1985), λ is an increasing function of the variance of information and a decreasing function of 
the variance of uninformed trading. 
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the order size.  The illiquidity variables that are used are the average of the marginal cost 
of trading, Cq = λq/P, where q and P are the monthly averages of trade size and price, 
respectively (or Cn = λn/P, where n is the monthly average of number of shares 
outstanding) and the relative fixed cost of trading, ψ/P.  These cost variables are 
estimated for the years 1984 and 1988.  
 
These measures of illiquidity are then used in a cross-section regression of monthly 
NYSE stock returns for the years 1984-1991.  The estimations are performed using 
pooled time series and cross section GLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the 
monthly portfolio return.  Portfolios are formed annually by sorting stocks into 25 (5x5) 
portfolios on size and within that on λ.  In addition to the two liquidity cost variables, the 
regression model includes the three Fama-French (1993) factors: The market return 
index, the small-minus-big firm return indexes and the high-minus-low book-to-market 
return index.  Thus, the returns are effectively the intercepts from the Fama-French three-
index model. 
 
The results show that Cq (or Cn) have a positive and significant effect on returns adjusted 
by the Fama-French factors, after controlling for firm size and price reciprocal.  For 
example, the excess monthly return on the highest Cq quintile is 0.55% higher than the 
respective return on the lowest Cq quintile.  In addition, Cq2 (or Cn2) have a negative and 
significant effect, consistent with the Amihud-Mendelson (1986) clientele effect that 
generates an increasing and concave relationship between return and illiquidity costs. 
Further, both ψ/P and (ψ/P)2 have positive and significant effects.  While the positive 
sign of ψ/P is consistent with a positive illiquidity effect, the positive coefficient of 
(ψ/P)2 is inconsistent with the Amihud-Mendelson concavity prediction – instead, it 
suggests a convex illiquidity effect.  When these finer measures of liquidity are used, 
both the bid-ask spread and the firm size become insignificant.  In conclusion, Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam’s results support the positive effect of illiquidity on expected stock 
returns. 
 
As pointed out, liquidity is an elusive concept and is hard to measure.  In addition, data 
such as bid-ask spread and intra-daily quotes and trades are hard to obtain.  Even if such 
data are available, tests of asset pricing models require data that span a long periods of 
time to increase the power of the tests.  Therefore, researchers often use alternative 
measures based on daily data on volume, shares outstanding and prices, which are 
available for most markets. 
 
Brennan, Chordia and Sunrahmanyam (1998) use the stock’s dollar trading volume as a 
measure of liquidity in a multi-factor asset pricing model, a version of the APT, where 
the stock’s excess return is a function of the loadings of the stock return on the factors. 
The study uses excess returns from a factor model (using either the Connor-Korajczyk 
(1988) or the Fama-French (1993) approach), thus obtaining risk-adjusted returns.  These 
risk-adjusted returns are regressed cross-sectionally on the stock’s volume (in log) as 
well as on other characteristics: Size, book-to-market ratio, price, dividend yield and past 
returns (to capture the momentum effect).  The study is performed using CRSP data for 
individual stocks over the period 1966-1995.  As expected, the results show that volume 
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has a negative and significant effect on risk-adjusted stock returns.  Specifically, a one 
standard deviation increase in the dollar volume brings about a decline in the monthly 
excess return of 0.29% for Nasdaq stocks and 0.11% for NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
 
Datar, Naik and Radcliff (1998) use stock turnover (the ratio of stock volume to the 
number of shares outstanding) as a measure of liquidity.  If in equilibrium less liquid 
stocks are allocated to investors with longer holding periods (Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986b)), or investors reduce their trading frequency of illiquid stocks (Constantinides 
(1986)), then even though liquidity is not directly observed, it can be inferred from the 
average holding period of the stock, which is the reciprocal of the stock turnover.22  
Datar et al. estimate the cross-section of NYSE stock returns (years: 1963-1991) on stock 
turnover, controlling for size, book-to-market ratio and beta, employing the Fama-
Macbeth (1973) method.  The prediction is that the longer the average holding period of 
the stock (which implies lower liquidity), or the lower the turnover, the higher the 
expected return.  The results are consistent with this prediction:  The cross section of 
stock returns is negatively related to stock turnover, with the effect being significant.  
The turnover coefficient was also negative and significant for each of the two subperiods.  
Similar results on the negative return-turnover relationship are obtained for the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange by Hu (1997).   
 
Rouwenhorst (1999) examines the returns in 20 emerging markets over 10 or less years.  
Sorting each country’s returns by turnover, he obtains no difference between high- and 
low-sorted returns.  However, there are no controls for other variables, and the test period 
may be too short.  He also finds that turnover is higher for small and high-beta firms; 
absent controls for size and risk in analyzing the return-turnover relationship,23 there may 
be a confounding of the turnover effect with that of size and risk.  Another study that uses 
turnover as a measure of liquidity is by Nguyen, Mishra and Prakash (2005).  They study 
the effect of turnover on stock returns in two ways, using 1970-2002 data.  In one test, 
they use the intercepts from Fama-French (1993) three-factor model (the market and 
factors for size and book-to-market ratio) and aggregate them into 25 portfolios, obtained 
by sorting on size or book-to-market and within that on turnover.  The average 
coefficients do not show a systematic relationship with the turnover portfolios, which is 
inconsistent with a liquidity effect.  In the second test, Nguyen et al. perform a cross-
section analysis using individual stocks (instead of portfolios), employing the Fama-
Macbeth (1973) method with the GLS setup of Ramaswamy and Litzenberger (1979).  
Controlling for beta, size, book-to-market ratio or for beta and co-skewness with the 
market (to capture a skewness preference by investors), they find that turnover has a 
negative and significant coefficient, which is consistent with the liquidity effect. 
 
Amihud (2002) examines the effect of illiquidity on the cross-section of stock returns 
using an illiquidity measure that is related to Kyle’s (1985) price impact coefficient λ. 
The measure is called ILLIQ = |R|/(P*VOL), where R is daily return, P is the closing 
daily price and VOL is the number of shares traded during the day.  Intuitively, ILLIQ 
                                                          
22 Indeed, Atkins and Dyl (1994) find a positive relationship across stocks between the bid-ask spread and 
the average holding period, defined as the reciprocal of turnover, after controlling for size. 
23 In Datar et al. (1998), using U.S. data, turnover alone was negatively related to return. 
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reflects the relative price change that is induced by a given dollar volume.  This ratio is 
averaged for each stock over a year to obtain the stock’s ILLIQ for that period.24  (As 
discussed later, ILLIQ varies over time.)  The stock’s ILLIQ is then used in cross-section 
regressions of monthly individual stock returns on their prior-year ILLIQ and other 
control variables: Beta, size, volatility, dividend yield and past returns (period: 1963-
1996, NYSE stocks).  The results show that ILLIQ has a positive and significant effect on 
stock returns, as suggested by the theory.  This effect is positive and significant both in 
January and in non-January months and over both sub-periods of the entire period. 
 
Gottesman and Jacoby (2005) consider the effect of the firm’s payout policy and 
investors’ personal taxes on the relationship between expected return and bid-ask spread 
in the Amihud-Mendelson (1986) framework.  Stock repurchase is tax-advantaged 
compared to dividend but it incurs transaction costs, thus a wider bid-ask spread reduces 
its attractiveness.  Investors maximize expected net return – after transaction cost and 
after tax.  Gottesman and Jacoby obtain that while for dividend-paying stock, return is an 
increasing and concave function of the bid-ask spread, for stock repurchases the function 
is increasing and it may be convex or concave, depending on the mass of investors’ 
holding-period clientele.  They test the theory using data from Nasdaq during 1993-1999, 
when stock repurchases were far more popular than in the 1961-1980 period studied by 
Amihud and Mendelson.  The results show that in general, the return-spread relationship 
is positive and concave (controlling for other characteristics).  This pattern also holds in a 
subsample of firms that pay dividends and do not repurchase their stock, whereas in the 
subsample of firms that repurchase their stock and pay no dividend the return-spread 
relationship is positive and possibly convex, but for this group the results are not 
statistically significant.  
 
The papers considered so far have used liquidity measures that are based on trading costs 
or investors’ holding periods.  Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) consider the effect of 
amortized spread, the product of the effective relative spread25 and the stock’s turnover 
(whose reciprocal gives the average holding period) on returns using annual data on 
NYSE/ AMEX stocks over the period 1983-1992.26 In the context of the simplest 
liquidity model (Proposition 1 of Section 2.2), the slope coefficient of a regression of 
expected return on the amortized spread should be 1. In the regression of Chalmers and 
Kadlec, controlling for size, book-to-market ratio and volatility, they find that the 
coefficient on amortized spread is positive and large, 7.9, and statistically significant with 
all the control variables (though insignificant in other specifications).  This large 
coefficient, while supporting the positive effect of amortized transaction costs on stock 
returns, is larger than would be predicted by the simplest liquidity theory.  This can 
possibly result from the omission of a relevant variable which is correlated with the 
                                                          
24 Hasbrouck (2005) estimates the cross-stock correlation between the Kyle’s λ, estimated from intraday 
data aggregated into 5-minutes intervals, and ILLIQ.  The Pearson (Spearman) correlation across stocks is 
0.54 (0.76).  The correlations are higher for ILLIQ1/2 and for stock portfolios. 
25 The effective relative spread is the difference between a transaction price and the preceding mid-point of 
the bid-ask spread, divided by price. 
26 The annual sample consists of only ten time periods — a small number and a short sample compared to 
other studies. 
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amortized spread. For instance, the liquidity clientele effect on excess return (r*j – rf) in 
Proposition 2 or the effect of liquidity risk described in Proposition 3. 
 
Swan and Westerholm’s (2002) measure of the illiquidity of stocks relative to bonds is 
the difference in amortized bid-ask spread for stocks and bonds, deflated by unity minus 
the absolute value of the transaction cost elasticity with respect to turnover.  The 
underlying model endogenizes trading, where investors trade until they are indifferent 
between trading further or not.  Their estimation, using Finnish data for 1993-1998, 
shows that their measure of illiquidity has a strong positive effect on the cross-section of 
stock returns. 
 
The difficulty of obtaining reliable liquidity measures from low-frequency (daily) data is 
addressed by Hasbrouck (2005) who examines three measures from daily data and 
correlates them with measures obtained from high-frequency microstructure data.  The 
Gibbs sampler estimates the effective cost of trading from the square root of the (negative 
of the) serial covariance of daily price changes (following Roll (1984)), but truncating the 
negative outcomes, where the extent of truncation is determined by a Bayesian 
estimation.  The Gibbs sampler is highly correlated with the effective spread estimated 
from transaction and quote data.  The other two are ILLIQ1/2 and Pastor and Stambaugh’s 
(2003) γ that measures the return reversal in response to volume shocks, which is larger 
for less liquid stocks (see below).  Hasbrouck then estimates the effects of these 
illiquidity measures on the cross-section of stock returns that are risk-adjusted by first 
employing the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model (following Brennan et al. (1998)) 
(period: 1962-2003).  The cross-sectional model that is estimated from monthly data 
using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method, also includes market capitalization (in log) and 
past returns.  The results show that both the Gibbs sampler and ILLIQ1/2 have positive 
and significant effect on the cross-section of stock returns, with the effect being stronger 
for NYSE/AMEX stocks than for Nasdaq stocks.  However, the estimated effect is not 
robust over January/non January time periods.  
 
A problem that is revisited at this stage by Spiegel and Wang (2005) is the possible 
confounding between the effects of illiquidity and risk on stock returns.  Given the strong 
positive relationship that they find between illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk27 (the 
standard deviation of factor-model residuals), the estimated return-liquidity effects may 
be confounded with the positive relationship between return and idiosyncratic risk that 
obtains if investors are not well-diversified (see, e.g., Levy (1977), Merton (1987)) or 
under the model of Constantinides (1986), where portfolio rebalancing is impeded by 
trading costs.  The risk variable, EIDIO, is the conditional idiosyncratic standard 
deviation of Fama-French (1993) three-factor model residuals, estimated by EGARCH. 
Spiegel and Wang estimate the effect of EIDIO and of some measures of liquidity on 
stocks’ risk-adjusted returns (following Brennan et al. (1998)) in a cross-sectional model 
(period: 1962-2003).  The illiquidity measures are Hasbrouck’s (2005) Gibbs sampler, 
                                                          
27 Inventory models of the bid-ask spread suggest a positive relationship between the bid-ask spread and 
risk, see Stoll (1978a, 1978b).  The positive relationship between the bid-ask spread and idiosyncratic risk 
is estimated by Benson and Hagerman (1974).  See also Amihud and Mendelson (1987, Section VIII) on 
the positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and the bid-ask spread. 
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Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ and Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) γ.  The model also includes 
a measure of liquidity – trading volume in dollars and in logarithm (see Brennan et al. 
(1998)) – as well as size (in log) and past returns, accounting for the momentum effect.  
The explanatory variables are lagged, reflecting the information investors had when 
making their investment decision.  The results show that whereas the illiquidity variables 
have a positive and significant effect in a model without EIDIO, their effect becomes 
insignificant when EIDIO is included in the model, whereas the coefficient of EIDIO is 
positive and significant through all models.  The coefficient of trading volume 
(particularly for NYSE/AMEX stocks), a measure of liquidity, is negative and significant 
in all models.  The results highlight the problem of measuring illiquidity and 
disentangling it from other measures such as idiosyncratic risk. 
 
All studies surveyed so far use historical returns to investigate the effects of liquidity on 
expected return.  Clearly, realized return is a very noisy measure of expected return. 
Loderer and Roth (2005) depart from this method and investigate how stock prices are 
affected by liquidity.  Clearly, controlling for future cash-flow growth and dividend 
payout, price is a measure of the expected return, and after controlling for risk, the results 
give the effect of liquidity on expected return.  Loderer and Roth use data from the Swiss 
Stock Exchange for the years 1995-2001 and regress stock P/E, the price-earning ratio, 
on liquidity, measured by the relative bid-ask spread, after controlling for projected 
earnings growth obtained from analysts’ reports, dividend payout ratio, risk and size 
(orthogonalized to the relative spread).  The results show that the spread has a negative 
and significant effect on the cross-section of stock prices, as expected by the theory.  A 
similar conclusion on the negative effect of illiquidity on stock prices is obtained when 
using trading volume as a measure of liquidity.  The price discount is economically 
significant, being 12% for a median-spread stock compared to a zero-spread stock for the 
median year in the sample.  Loderer and Roth replicate this methodology and examine 
the price discount, as a result of illiquidity, for Nasdaq stocks.  The median discount there 
is 28% (for the median year). 
 
 
3.2.2 Liquidity Changes Over Time 
 
If liquidity affects asset prices, it stands to reason that changes in liquidity should change 
asset prices (ceteris paribus).  This hypothesis is examined by Amihud, Mendelson and 
Wood (1990).  They suggest that the stock market crash of October 19, 1987 can be 
partly explained by a decline in investors’ perception of the market’s liquidity.  At the 
time, a popular investment strategy was “portfolio insurance,” by which stockholdings 
are reduced when prices fall and increased when prices rise.  In an infinitely liquid 
market, such a strategy would have no impact on prices even when exercised by many 
investors.  However, in the days prior to the crash there were massive stock sales and 
price declines, which may have caused investors to adjust downward their beliefs about 
market liquidity.  Liquidity asset pricing theory implies that a downward revision in 
liquidity should cause a decline in stock prices.  Amihud, Mendelson and Wood test this 
hypothesis as follows.  They regress cross-sectionally the risk-adjusted returns of NYSE 
stocks that are included in the S&P 500 index on October 19, 1987 on the change in 
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liquidity during that day, measured by the average daily bid-ask spread or by depth (the 
number of shares that could be traded at the quoted bid and ask prices).  The results show 
that stocks that suffered the greatest decline in liquidity on that day also suffered the 
greatest decline in prices.  Further, stocks whose liquidity recovered more by the end of 
the month (October 30, 1987) also enjoyed a greater recovery in price. 
 
A well-controlled case of changes in stock liquidity is the case of transfer of stocks in the 
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange from a once-a-day call auction to semi-continuous trading. 
Stocks were transferred in batches, an average of 7 stocks in each, at random times over 
the years 1987-1994, without company discretion – all transfer decisions were made by 
the Exchange.  This avoids the self-selection problem that arises when stocks transfer 
voluntarily from one trading system to another, such as moving from the Nasdaq to the 
NYSE or AMEX (see below), which may reflect private information.  This case is also 
different from the cases in European exchanges where an entire market, or most of it, was 
transferred from an auction market to continuous trading. 
 
Stocks that were transferred to the semi-continuous trading system obviously enjoyed 
greater liquidity in general.  Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) find that their 
trading volume increased significantly relative to the market’s and their liquidity ratio 
(the ratio of average absolute daily return to average daily dollar volume) declined.  
Consequently, the prices of the transferred stocks rose by at least 5%-6% and remained 
high.  Cross-sectionally, the price increase was greater for stocks that enjoyed a greater 
increase in liquidity.  Moreover, there was a liquidity externality: The prices of closely-
related stocks (stocks of the same company with different voting rights) that were not 
transferred also rose, although by less. 
 
Similar results are obtained by Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) for the Paris Bourse’s 
transfer of stocks from a call to a continuous market, and by Kalay, Wei and Wohl (2002) 
for a later improvement in the trading system at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.  In both 
studies, stocks that were transferred to a more liquid trading system enjoyed an increase 
in prices.  Interestingly, Muscarella and Piwowar as well as Lauterbach (2001) find that 
some thinly-traded stocks that are transferred from the call to the continuous market 
realize a decline in liquidity and a decline in price.  Lauterbach finds that the price 
decline is positively associated with a decline in relative trading volume that measures 
liquidity.  Stocks that were immediately returned to the call market realized both a price 
increase and a rise in liquidity.  This suggests that for thinly-traded stocks, a call auction 
may be an efficient mechanism to consolidate trading which contributes to liquidity and 
value, and further reinforces the positive relationship between liquidity and stock 
prices.28
 
In another study on the effect of changes in the trading environment on stock prices, 
Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) examined the effect of changes in the forward trading 
facility (Badla) for 91 stocks on the Bombay Stock Exchange—the abolition on 12/1993 
                                                          
28 If the estimated price increase when stocks were transferred to a continuous market was due to some 
reason other than the increase in liquidity, this would likely result in the opposite price pattern.   
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and the reinstatement on 3/1994.  The Badla enables trading without affecting delivery, 
which was attractive to short-term traders.  When it was abolished, the liquidity of the 
affected stocks declined sharply and their price fell by about 15% compared to the price 
of non-Badla stocks. In a cross-section analysis, Berkman and Eleswarapu find the 
decline in prices of Badla stocks was significantly associated with the decline in their 
liquidity (controlling for the change in volatility). 
Exogenous changes in stock liquidity occur when the composition of the S&P 500 index 
changes.  Stocks included in the index are subject to a great deal of trading that is not 
based on stock-specific information, such as by index funds and by hedgers of index 
futures and index options.  Thus, including the stocks in the S&P 500 index increases 
their liquidity.  It has been documented that stocks that join the index enjoy a price 
increase whereas those that are deleted suffer a price decline.  These changes have been 
attributed to demand pressures.  Hegde and Mcdermott (2003) document increases in the 
liquidity of stocks that are added to the S&P 500 index, with liquidity being measured in 
a number of ways: bid-ask spread (quoted and effective), volume, trading frequency, and 
the estimated parameters from Kyle’s model, λn/P and particularly ψ/P (see above under 
the analysis of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)).  For deleted stocks, they find a 
decline in liquidity although the results are weaker since deletions are very noisy events. 
The authors then test in a cross-section regression the hypothesis that the price changes 
of these stocks are related to changes in their liquidity, measured by direct information 
cost.  They find that the price increase of added stocks is positively and significantly 
associated with the improvement in liquidity. 
Exchange listing generally induces improvement in liquidity and an increase in price. 
However, being voluntary, it may reflect self-selection due to favorable information.  
Kadlec and McConnell (1994) and Elyasiani, Hauser and Lauterbach (2000) examine the 
effect of listing on both stock value and stock liquidity.  The respective samples are 273 
stocks that listed on the NYSE during 1980-1989 and 895 listings on NYSE and AMEX 
between 1971 and 1994.  Both studies find that listing brought about a significant 
increase in stock price and at the same time a significant decline in the bid-ask spread.  In 
a cross-section analysis, the studies find that price changes are negatively associated with 
changes in the spread, as would be predicted if liquidity enhances value.  (In addition, the 
studies control for the change in number of shareholders and change in volatility). 
Bennett and Wei (2004) too find that stocks that transferred from Nasdaq to the NYSE 
enjoyed greater liquidity and an increase in price, and they include controls to overcome 
the self-selection problem.  
When a stock is delisted from an exchange, its liquidity dramatically declines.  
Involuntary delisting occurs because of violations of listing requirements, and the 
delisted stocks are subsequently traded in less liquid markets.  Since delisting is 
involuntary, the delisting event per se does not convey new private information, and thus 
any observed price effect on the delisting day reflects the effect of the change in liquidity 
due to the change in the stock’s trading arena.   Angel, Harris, Panchapagesan and 
Werner (2005) examine stocks that are involuntarily delisted from the Nasdaq Stock 
Market and are subsequently traded in the OTC Bulletin Board and in the Pink Sheets.  
They find a large and significant deterioration in liquidity, measured by trading volume, 
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number of quotes per day and the bid-ask spread, and a large and significant price 
decline, about 18%, around the delisting day.  This price decline understates the total 
effect of delisting because the event was partly anticipated.  Similar results are obtained 
by Macey and O’Hara (2005) for 55 stocks that were delisted from the NYSE.  For a sub-
sample of 12 large stocks they find that stock prices fell along with a decline in trading 
volume and an increase in the percent bid-ask spread (the dollar bid-ask spread 
declined).29  
 
Some corporate events may change the liquidity of the firm’s stock and, if liquidity is 
priced, they can affect the stock price.  Amihud, Mendeslon and Uno (1999) study a case 
where companies in Japan reduced the minimum trading unit of their stock and 
consequently increased the number of their individual shareholders.  The greater breath 
of ownership led to significant increases in stock liquidity and in stock prices.30  Amihud, 
Lauterbach and Mendelson (2003) examine the increase in stock liquidity that follows the 
exercise of outstanding stock warrants, which increases the stock’s float without 
changing anything else in the firm.  They find that this led to a decline in stock illiquidity 
(measured by Roll’s (1984) bid-ask spread) and that stock prices have risen significantly, 
with abnormal returns being positively and significantly associated with the improvement 
in liquidity. 
  
The time series effect of market-wide changes in stock liquidity on stock prices is 
examined by Amihud (2002) and Jones (2002).  Amihud proposes that (i) expected stock 
return for period t+1 is an increasing function of illiquidity for t+1 as expected in period 
t, and (ii) an unexpected rise in illiquidity in period t lowers stock prices in the same 
period, producing a negative returns-unexpected liquidity relationship, consistent with 
the theoretical results in Acharya and Pedersen (2005; see Proposition 4 in Section 2.4). 
To test these hypotheses, Amihud constructs a measure of aggregate illiquidity, AILLIQ 
(the average of stocks’ ILLIQ, the daily ratio of absolute return to dollar volume), for 
NYSE stocks between 1962 and 1997.  He finds that average stock excess return 
(monthly or annual) is an increasing function of lagged AILLIQ, which measures 
expected illiquidity (AILLIQ is highly autoregressive), and is a decreasing function of 
contemporaneous unexpected AILLIQ (the residual from an autoregressive model of 
AILLIQ).  Both results are consistent with the liquidity theory of asset pricing.  
 
Amihud further proposes that both effects of illiquidity should be stronger for less-liquid 
stocks.  Liquid stocks, while being subject to the same effects, become more attractive 
when liquidity worsens – a “flight to liquidity” – which mitigates the negative effects of 
increased illiquidity.  The results support this hypothesis.  The negative effect on returns 
of market liquidity shocks, and the positive effect of lagged illiquidity on subsequent 
                                                          
29 Delisting, however, while involuntary, may not be totally beyond the firm’s control. Reasons for 
delisting include the stock price being below some minimum, too little ownership dispersion and 
delinquency in meeting SEC filing requirements. These problems can be rectified by the firm if it chooses. 
If it fails to do so, the delisting that ensues due to these reasons may reflect information and ought to be 
treated separately. 
30 The positive effect of increased ownership breath on stock price can also be explained by Merton’s 
(1987) model. 
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return, are both stronger for smaller firms, with the effect being monotonic in size, 
suggesting that the exposure to liquidity shocks is greater for less liquid stocks. 
 
Jones (2002) examines the time series effects of market liquidity on stock prices over the 
twentieth century.  He uses two measures of liquidity: transaction costs, measured by the 
bid-ask spread and brokerage fees on the Dow Jones component stocks, and stock 
turnover.  Jones finds that stock returns can be predicted a year or more ahead: High 
spreads predict high stock returns and high turnover predicts low stock returns. 
 
The time-series liquidity-expected return relationship is further studied by Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundblad (2005) using data from 19 emerging markets and the U.S. (which 
proxies the world index) and employing a VAR analysis.  The measure of illiquidity used 
is the relative number of days of zero returns in each stock, averaged over all stocks used 
for the country index.  This follows Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) who suggest 
that higher transaction costs reduce the likelihood of trading for a given information 
signal.  Indeed, the authors find that this measure (or a related measure of no-trade days) 
is highly correlated with other measures of illiquidity for U.S. data.  The results show that 
(a) liquidity predicts return (monthly data) with the effect being negative, and (b) 
unexpected liquidity is positively correlated with contemporaneous returns.  Both results 
are consistent with those of Amihud (2002) and Proposition 4 in Section 2.4.  The results 
are qualitatively similar when returns are replaced by dividend yield.  The use of data 
from emerging markets enables also to examine the effect of liquidity on stock returns 
when the market is closed to foreign investors and when it is opened up, the latter being 
measured by foreign investors’ holdings relative to the market capitalization.  The 
estimations then show that opening up a country’s capital market to foreign investors 
reduces the effect (i.e., the coefficient) of liquidity on stock returns.  
 
 
 
3.2.3  Pricing of Liquidity Risk 
 
The studies reviewed in Section 2.2 examine the effects of the level of liquidity on stock 
returns. Since liquidity varies over time, as documented in Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), 
Huberman and Halka (2001), Amihud (2002), and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2002), it stands to reason that liquidity risk should also be priced. 
 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) propose that asset prices should reflect a premium for the 
sensitivity of stock returns to market-wide liquidity: Stocks with greater exposure to 
market liquidity shocks – i.e., with greater systematic liquidity risk – should earn higher 
returns.   
 
Pastor and Stambaugh’s market liquidity measure is based on Campbell, Grossman and 
Wang’s (1993) observation that in a regression of a stock’s daily return on its signed 
lagged dollar volume, the coefficient which captures the bounce in the stock price 
following a given trading volume is more negative for less liquid stocks.  Pastor and 
Stambaugh perform monthly estimations of the following model for each stock j: 
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(3.1) rej,d+1 = θj + φjrd + γjsign(rej,d)·vj,d + ej,d+1 , 
 
where rej,d is the return on stock j on day d in excess of the market return and vj,d is the 
daily dollar volume.31  Stocks with more negative γj are interpreted as less liquid.32  The 
market’s liquidity for month t, γt, is the average of the individual stocks’ γj,t.  Finally, the 
liquidity measure Lt is the residual from an AR1 model of Δγt = γt - γt-1 (adjusted for 
variations in market capitalization over time), and it is serially uncorrelated.  The stock’s 
exposure to liquidity shocks is βL, the regression coefficient of the stock returns on Lt, 
with the model also including the three Fama-French (1993) factors.  The study 
eventually uses the predicted  βL, which is a function of seven stock characteristics,33 or 
historical values of βL. The data are for NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq over the period 1966-
1999. 
 
If liquidity risk is priced, stock returns should be increasing in their liquidity beta βL. 
Pastor and Stambaugh sort stocks in each year by their predicted βL (based on historical 
βL and other stock characteristics) and aggregate them into 10 portfolios. The return 
series of these portfolios are then linked over time to form a time series of returns, which 
are used to estimate portfolio alphas from the market model or from Fama-French three- 
or four-factors model.  Pastor and Stambaugh find that these portfolio alphas are 
increasing over the 10 beta portfolios which are ranked from low to high βL. That is, the 
expected return is an increasing function of the stock’s sensitivity to market-wide 
liquidity shocks, which means that liquidity risk is priced.  
 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) study a broad model of pricing liquidity level and liquidity 
risk. Expected excess return over the risk-free rate, E(rej,t+1), is a function of both the 
expected illiquidity, E(cj,t+1), and four systematic risk variables: the ordinary return beta β 
= cov(rj, rm)/var(rm-cm) and three liquidity-related betas, βL1 = cov(cj, cm)/var(rm-cm), βL2 
= cov(rj, cm)/var(rm-cm) and βL3 = cov(cj, rm)/var(rm-cm), where cj and cm are the illiquidity 
cost of stock j and of the market, respectively (see Section 2 above). The (unconditional 
version of the) model is: 
 
(3.2) ( ) ( ) ( )32111 LLLitfit cErrE ββββλκ −−+++= ++  
 
where κ adjusts for the difference between the average holding period and the monthly 
estimation period. The liquidity risk βL2 is analogous to that used by Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003). 
 
The empirical estimation of the model employs as a measure of illiquidity Amihud’s 
(2002) ILLIQ, calculated from daily CRSP returns and volume for NYSE/AMEX stocks 
                                                          
31 On a day of zero stock return, the volume obtains the sign of the market return. 
32 Pastor and Stambaugh find that γj increases in firm size, as expected if γj measures liquidity.  However, 
Hasbrouck (2005) finds a small and unstable correlation between γj and a measure of Kyle’s λj that is 
estimated from microstructure data.  
33 The characteristics with the most stable effect over time (and the sign of their coefficients) are historical 
beta (+), return volatility (-) and price (+). 
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for the period 1964-1999. Stocks are sorted every year by their ILLIQ or by their size and 
grouped into 25 portfolios.  The monthly illiquidity of each portfolio and of the market is 
calculated as the residual from an autoregressive model of the portfolio (average) ILLIQ, 
adjusted for market capitalization.  The four portfolio betas are estimated from the 
monthly data over the entire period.  Naturally, β is higher for less liquid stocks.  As for 
the three liquidity betas, illiquid stocks have higher βL1 and more negative βL2 and βL3. 
Thus, the absolute values of the liquidity betas – the measures of exposure to liquidity 
risk – are greater for less liquid stock. The higher liquidity risk of illiquid stocks is 
consistent with the notion of “flight to quality” or “flight to liquidity”: in times of 
liquidity crisis, the illiquid securities suffer the most.  
 
Model (3.2) is estimated using GMM and the results show that the excess return is 
positively and significantly related to the portfolio’s βnet = β +βL1 – βL2 – βL3 as well as to 
its level of illiquidity E(c). The model’s explanatory power in the cross-section is higher 
than the standard CAPM. Indeed, the liquidity-adjsuted CAPM fairs better in 
specification tests and has a higher R2 .  
 
To test the effect of liquidity risk over and above the effects of market risk and liqudity 
level, the authors estimate  
 ( ) ( ) ( )3212111 LLLitfit cErrE βββλβλκ −−+++= ++  
 
The estimated coefficient on liquidity risk λ2 is positive and significant in several, but not 
all, specifications. This is consistent with liquidity risk being priced.  
 
Finally, Acharya and Pedersen assess the relative economic significance of liquidity level 
and liquidity risk by considering the return premium required to hold the most illiquid 
stocks rather than the liquid ones. Under the restriction of one risk premium λ and with κ 
calibrated to the average turnover, the total annual liquidity risk premium is estimated to 
1.1% while the premium for liquidity level is 3.5%. When the risk premium on each kind 
of liquidity risk is estimated freely, the effect of liquidity risk rises, but the statistical 
significance is limited. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) find a larger effect of liqudity risk, 
but they do not control for liquidity level.  
 
Another specification of a model with systematic liquidity risk is proposed by Martinez, 
Nieto, Rubio and Tapia (2005).  Beginning with the pricing kernel Et-1[Mt(1+Rj,t )], they 
assume that Mt = d0,t-1+d1,t-1rm,t + d2,t-1Lt, where Lt is a replicating liquidity portfolio, and 
dk,t = dk,0 + dk,1bmt for k = 0, 1, 2, with bmt being the book-to-market ratio.  This gives 
rise to the asset pricing model 
 
(3.3) E(rj) = c0 + c1βj,m + c2βj,bm + c3βj,mbm + c4βj,L + c5βj,Lbm   , 
 
where βj,x = cov(rj,t , xt)/var(xt) and βj,xbm = cov(rj,t , bmt-1xt)/var(bmt-1xt) for x = rm or L.  It 
is expected that βj,L < 0 and βj,Lmb < 0.  Notably, βj,L is related to Pastor and Stambaugh’s 
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liquidity beta and to Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) βL2.  The focus of the test is on 
whether liquidity is priced, i.e., whether c4 and c5 are significantly different from zero. 
 
For the factor L, the study uses three measures of liquidity: Pastor and Stambaugh’s 
(2003) market liquidity, Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ and the return differential between 
portfolios of stocks with high and low sensitivity to changes in their relative bid-ask 
spread.  The data are obtained from the Spanish stock market for the years 1993-2000. 
The results show that when L is measured as ILLIQ, the coefficients c4 and c5 are 
negative and significant, that is, higher (absolute) liquidity-related betas lead to higher 
expected returns. 
 
The pricing of liquidity risk in nineteen emerging markets is studied by Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundband (2005) in a model that extends Acharya and Pedersen (2005).  They model 
the effects of liquidity factors – both a country and a global (U.S.-based) factor, as well 
as a country and a global (U.S.) return factor, allowing for different prices for the two 
risks, market and liquidity.  Further, their model enables to study the differences in the 
effects on expected return of segmented and integrated markets, with the difference being 
whether or not the risks due to the global return and liquidity factors are present.  The 
results show that while the price of the local market risk is not significant, the price of 
local liquidity risk is positive and significant.  The positive and significant effect of the 
local liquidity risk is preserved in a mixed model that allows for both segmentation and 
integration.  In the latter model, the price of global liquidity risk is positive but only 
marginally significant (the same applies to the pricing of the global return factor).  The 
best fitting model assumes a locally-segmented market and estimates a compensation for 
local liquidity risk of 85 basis points per month.34  This suggests that opening up the 
local market to foreign investors does not eliminate the effect of local liquidity risk, 
which remains the most important priced factor. 
 
Sadka (2003) examines the pricing of liquidity risk in a factor model that includes the 
three Fama-French factors and a liquidity factor L, calculated as an average of the stocks’ 
permanent market impact coefficient.  This coefficient is similar to Kyle’s λ as estimated 
by Glosten and Harris (1988) but it separates permanent from transitory price impact 
effects, and the measure that is eventually used reflects only the permanent price impact 
(period: 1983-2001).  For each portfolio, formed based on a 5x5 momentum/liquidity 
sorting or size/book-to-market sorting, the factor loadings (β coefficients) are estimated 
in a model that includes L and the three Fama-French factors.  Notably, the β coefficient 
of factor L is related Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) βL2.  Finally, the asset pricing 
relationship is estimated by a cross-section regression of monthly returns on the factor 
loadings, employing the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method.  The results show that the 
liquidity factor is priced, with a positive risk premium, whereas the other factors are not.  
This supports the importance of liquidity risk in asset pricing.  However, Sadka reports 
that the return on high-minus-low price impact is statistically insignificant, which is 
                                                          
34 In this model, the estimated effect of the level of liquidity on expected return is positive, which is 
contrary to theory.  
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inconsistent with the results of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996).  This may be due to 
the use of different measures of price impact or a different study period. 
 
Fujimoto and Watanabe (2005) propose that the effects on stock returns of liquidity – 
both level and risk – on stock returns varies over time across identifiable states.  They 
estimate the liquidity beta from a regression of portfolio return on a liquidity index (the 
negative of the residuals of an AR(2) model of modified ILLIQ) by a regime-switching 
model.  This liquidity beta is analogous to that in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and to βL2 
in Acharya and Pedersen (2005).  Fujimoto and Watanabe find that the liquidity betas are 
higher – for both large and small firm portfolios – in states when investors may expect 
liquidity needs, especially when turnover is abnormally high.35  The high liquidity-beta 
states are identified to be during 43-47 months (depending on the portfolio sorting 
method) out of the 480 months of the study period, 1965-2004.  They subsequently find 
that in states of high liquidity betas, there is a greater effect on stock returns of the level 
of liquidity and of the price of liquidity risk (measured by the coefficients of the liquidity 
betas). 
 
Whereas all previous studies used a measure of liquidity as a factor, Liu (2004) uses a 
factor-mimicking stock portfolio that reflects the liquidity premium, constructed in a 
similar way to the Fama-French SMB and HML factors.  Liu measures stock illiquidity in 
each month as the sum of the number of no-trading days and the average reciprocal of 
daily turnover (scaled) over the prior 250 trading days.  Illiquid stocks have both more 
non-trading day and higher value of the reciprocal of turnover, which proxies the stock’s 
holding period (see Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Datar, Naik and Radcliff (1998)).  
Stocks are then sorted by this illiquidity measure into 10 portfolios.  The sample includes 
NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks over 41 years, 1963-2003.  The results are that return 
alphas from the Fama-French model increase almost monotonically in the rank of 
illiquidity, with the difference in alphas between high and low illiquidity being 
significant.  Liu’s novel construction of a factor-mimicking portfolio of high-minus-low 
illiquidity reinforces the earlier results: Liquidity risk is priced.  Liu then proposes a 
model with only two factors: excess market return and the illiquidity factor.  The alphas 
from this model are not significantly related to stock size or to book-to-market ratio, 
supporting the adequacy of the liquidity-based two-factor asset pricing model.  This 
model also renders the momentum effect insignificant after adjusting for trading costs. 
 
Another form of liquidity risk is studied by Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman 
(2001) who extend the Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) approach to 
estimate a model of cross-sectional risk-adjusted returns on stock characteristics. As 
liquidity they use trading activity measured either as dollar trading volume (as in 
Brennan et al. (1998)) or turnover (as in Datar, Naik and Radcliff (1998)).  A novel 
aspect of their analysis is the inclusion of the volatility of trading activity.  The results 
show that both the level and volatility of trading activity have a negative and significant 
effect on risk-adjusted stock returns.  Their finding that investors demand a compensation 
                                                          
35 The study identifies other variables that indicate liquidity needs. The liquidity beta is also high  in states 
of high volatility, high probability of recession, low growth of the index of leading indicators and low 
consumer expectations. 
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for liquidity volatility is contrary to the authors’ initial hypothesis. The authors suggest 
that the effect of liquidity volatility may be due to its correlation with some omitted and 
unknown risk factor.  Alternatively, volatility in trading activity may imply larger 
investor following which, by Merton (1987), should lead to lower expected return. Yet 
another hypothesis would be that liquidity volatility could be helpful to investors if they 
can choose to trade when liquidity is favorable. The finding of Chordia et al. is not 
directly comparable to the above studies by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) that focus on systematic liqudity risk, not total volatility.  
 
The above papers study the effects of liquidity costs which result in part from asymmetric 
information (see Section 2.7 above).  Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) suggest that 
information risk affects asset returns since asymmetric information exposes uninformed 
investors to the risk of being unable to infer information from prices, and this risk is 
priced. They test this hypothesis on the cross-section of asset returns, employing their 
measure PIN, the probability of informed trading, estimated by maximum likelihood 
from a structural model, following Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997).  PIN is an estimate 
of the fraction of information-based orders, based on the imbalance between buy and sell 
trades.  They indeed find that across stocks, PIN is negatively correlated with size and 
positively correlated with the bid-ask spread.  Using data for NYSE stocks over the years 
1983-1998, the effect of PIN is examined in a cross-section regression of stock returns 
with controls for beta, size and book-to-market ratio, employing the methods of Fama-
Macbeth (1973) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979).  The results show that PIN 
has a positive and significant coefficient. The positive effect of PIN survives when other 
variables – bid-ask spread, return standard deviation, turnover and the coefficient of 
variation of turnover – are included in the equation.  In a multiple regression, the 
liquidity measures have the expected signs (positive for the bid-ask spread, negative for 
turnover), yet the positive and significant effect of PIN means that it contains information 
beyond other liquidity-related variables. (The paper finds some puzzling results for the 
spread in certain specifications.) The results thus suggest that the risk of informed trading 
is priced.  
 
 
3.2.4 Restricted Stock  
 
The existence of a liquidity effect may be tested directly by comparing two assets that are 
identical in every respect except in their liquidity.  As pointed out in the introduction to 
this section, the price difference between such two assets can be attributed to the effect of 
liquidity.  This is the case with restricted stocks.  In the United States, restricted or 
“letter” stocks that are issued by publicly-traded companies are not registered with the 
SEC for trading in public markets,36 but they can sometimes be traded privately, and the 
private transaction prices are reported to the SEC.  Until 1990, the SEC required that 
restricted stocks would not be traded in the public markets for at least two years after 
                                                          
36 Such stocks may be issued when a public firm raises private capital or as part of an acquisition.  
Restricted stocks may also be held by company founders or insiders who are prohibited from selling their 
shares in the open market for a period of time. 
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issuance.  Thereafter, the holder could sell the stock in the public market subject to some 
restrictions, and block sales of restricted stocks following the 2-year period required 
registration with the SEC.  In 1990, the SEC dropped the registration requirement for 
block sales and in 1997 it lowered the minimum holding period from two years to one 
year, which consequently increased the liquidity of restricted stocks. 
 
The 1971 Institutional Investor Study conducted by the SEC examines the discounts on 
398 letter stock transactions over the 1966-9 period compared to their publicly-traded 
counterparts.  The study finds a mean discount of 26% and a median discount of 24%, 
with smaller companies associated on average with larger discounts.  Gelman (1972) 
studies the prices of restricted stocks purchased by investment companies that specialized 
in the purchase of such stock using 89 transactions over the 1968-70 period and finds a 
mean and median discount of 33%.  Trout (1977, study period 1968-1972, 60 
transactions) finds an average discount of 33%, and Maher (1976, study period 1969-
1973, 34 transactions) finds restricted stock discount of 35% (both mean and median).  
Solberg (1979) analyzes the discounts approved by courts (based on a number of 
underlying studies) for the lower marketability of restricted stock, finding a median 
discount of 39%.   
 
Silber (1991) studies 69 restricted stock issues over the 1981-88 period, finding a mean 
discount of 34%.  Silber also finds that the discount is an increasing function of the size 
of the restricted block transaction relative to the total common stock, and a decreasing 
function of the company’s size and its profitability, controlling for special relationship 
between the company and the restricted stock holder.  That is, greater liquidity of the 
traded shares generates a positive externality on the value of the restricted stock (see also 
Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997)), and the discount is greater for “problem 
firms” (with low profitability).  
 
Generally, restricted stock discounts over the pre-1990 period were around 1/3 of the 
value of the equivalent – but publicly traded – stock.  Post-1997 studies find similar 
behavior but lower discounts ranging between 13% and 21%, consistent with the less-
stringent restrictions on restricted stock during the later period (Pratt (2003)).  To 
illustrate the meaning of a discount of 1/3 of value in terms of excess return, consider the 
following.  Assume that the annual return on the publicly-traded stock is 10%, and that 
the restriction period is 2.5 years (including restrictions on the rate of unwinding the 
position).  Then, the annual excess return due to the illiquidity of the restricted stock is 
19%.  
 
The value effect of restrictions on trading is studied by Chen and Xiong (2001) for 
restricted stocks in China.  There, a typical listed company has, in addition to its traded 
stock, two classes of restricted stock: Institutional stocks that can be transferred only in 
irregularly scheduled auctions and state shares that are only privately transferable.  The 
study obtains data on auction prices of institutional shares and the prices of private 
transactions for the state shares.  Chen and Xiong find that the discounts on the two types 
of restricted shares compared to their publicly-traded counterparts is 78% and 86%, 
respectively.  As in Silber (1991), the illiquidity discount decreases in the firm’s size 
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(measured by book value) and increases if it has problems, such as a low price-to-book 
ratio.  The discount also declines in the firm’s age. 
 
 
 
3.3 Fixed-Income Markets 
 
The fixed income markets provide a fruitful area for examining the effects of liquidity on 
asset prices, since the cash flows for fixed-income instruments are typically known with 
greater certainty than in the case of stocks.  Studies of the effects of liquidity on bonds 
examine the effect of liquidity on the bond’s yield to maturity, which – for riskless bonds, 
such as government securities – measures the expected return if the bond is held to 
maturity.  For corporate bonds which can default, the yield to maturity after controlling 
for the effect of default provides a low-noise estimate of the expected return, compared to 
the case of stocks where realized returns are used to estimate expected returns.  
 
 
3.3.1  U.S. Treasury Securities 
 
A key advantage of using U.S. Treasury securities is that they are risk-free, thus it is 
unnecessary to separate the default premium from a liquidity premium, as is the case with 
corporate bonds.  This provides relatively “clean” tests of the effects of liquidity on bond 
yields (although one must be mindful of repo and tax effects as discussed below).  
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) directly test the effect of bond liquidity on yields, without 
the need to control for risk.  They compare the yields on Treasury notes and bills with the 
same time to maturity.  With less than six months to maturity, both are discount 
instruments with identical payoffs.  However, the two instruments are traded in different 
markets with bills being far more liquid. This is because notes with a short time left to 
maturity are “off-the-run,” having been issued long ago and locked in investors' 
portfolios, whereas bills are issued frequently for short maturities and are actively traded  
throughout their life, being effectively “on-the-run” instruments. The brokerage fee per 
$1 million was $12.50-$25 for bills compared with $78 1/8 for notes; bid-ask spreads for 
bills were of the order of $1/128 compared to $1/32 for notes, both per $100 face value; 
and the search for a counterparty for notes took significantly longer than for bills.  This 
gives rise to the hypothesis that, bills should have a lower yield to maturity than notes 
with the same time to maturity. 
 
The hypothesis is tested on the yield differential of 489 pairs of notes and bills with less 
than 6 months to maturity over 37 trading days during the period April-November 1987, 
using actual quotes “pulled off the screen.”  The pairs are constructed by matching a note 
with bills whose maturities straddled the note’s.   The average bid-ask spread on the notes 
and bills are, respectively, 3 basis points and 0.78 basis point.  The average note yield is 
6.52% compared to 6.09% for the bills, a difference of 43 basis points, which is 
significant both economically and statistically.  This suggests a yield premium due to 
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illiquidity.37  In addition, given the higher fixed cost of trading notes, Amihud and 
Mendelson hypothesize that the yield differential should be larger for shorter maturities.  
They indeed find that the notes-bills yield differential is increasing in the reciprocal of 
the time to maturity. The notes-bills yield differential is also found to be declining in the 
note’s coupon, reflecting constraints on some institutions to distribute only accrued 
interest. This liquidity constraints on these institutions makes them pay a premium for the 
liquidity afforded by the notes’ coupon. 
 
It would seem that the notes-bills yield differential provides a profitable and riskless 
arbitrage opportunity: buy the high-yield note and short a similar-maturity low-yield bill, 
holding them to maturity.  However, this exercise ignores the very essence of the 
illiquidity: Arbitrage trades also entail transaction costs.  Amihud and Mendelson 
simulate this arbitrage transaction, taking into account the associated transaction costs: 
The bid-ask spread, brokerage fees and cost of carrying the short position.  At the end, 
the apparent arbitrage profit disappears (it is insignificantly different from zero).  This 
suggests that the price differential between securities of different liquidity is bounded by 
arbitrage.  
 
Kamara (1994) studies the determinants of the yield differentials for matched-maturity 
note-bill pairs using 91 observations of bid and ask prices for Treasury bills and notes 
with about 14 weeks to maturity over the period January 1977-July 1984.  He posits that 
the notes-bills yield differential reflects differences in liquidity, tax treatment and dealer 
inventories.  Kamara proposes to measure the liquidity difference between notes and bills 
as the product of the volatility of the underlying rate (estimated from a GARCH model) 
by the ratio of the bills’ turnover to the notes’ turnover, where turnover is calculated 
using the ratio of dealer transactions to the absolute value of their net positions.  This 
measure of “liquidity risk” of a trade reflects the variance of the security’s value between 
the point in time when a trader wishes to trade and the point when she actually trades 
(Garbade and Silber (1979), Mendelson (1982)).  This variance is proportional to the 
time needed to find a counterparty and execute the transaction, and to the security’s 
underlying return volatility.  Since the average time to transact is not available, the 
turnover ratio is used as a proxy for the time ratio. 
 
Kamara finds an average notes-bills bid yield differential of 34 basis points, a statistically 
and economically significant difference.  The notes-bills bid yield differential is found to 
be increasing in the liquidity risk, supporting the role of liquidity in the pricing of bonds, 
as in Amihud and Mendelson (1991).  In addition, Kamara finds a significant tax effect, 
reflecting the asymmetric tax treatment of notes priced above par value vs. notes priced 
below par value, and a transient effect of dealers’ inventories: An increase in dealers’ 
inventories of notes, which are the less-liquid asset, reduces the notes-bills yield 
differential.38                     
                                                          
37 A similar observation on the yield differential between notes and bills is made by Garbade (1984).  The 
notes-bills difference has considerably shrunk recently (Strebulaev (2002)), which may be attributed at 
least in part to structural changes in the fixed-income market. 
38 The inventory effect is consistent with the optimal dealer pricing policies derived by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980).   
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While Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Kamara (1994) compare “on-” and “off-the-
run” short-term U.S. Treasury securities, other studies examine this issue in the context 
of long-maturity Treasury bonds.   In general, Treasury bonds are actively traded right 
after they are issued, as a large part of them are initially bought not by their ultimate 
investors but by dealers and speculators.  However, once a new Treasury of the same 
maturity is issued – which may be a month or two later, the now older security goes “off-
the-run,” as most trading interest shifts to the newly issued security and much of the old 
security’s units are already included in portfolios of their ultimate investors who are less 
likely to trade them before maturity.  Off-the-run securities are almost always less liquid 
than on-the-run securities of the same class, and this difference may be exploited to study 
whether and how illiquidity differences translate into a yield difference. 
 
Warga (1992) studies holding period returns on constant duration portfolios of U.S. 
Treasury notes and bonds, and measures the yield premium generated by liquidity 
differences in bonds.  He constructs portfolios of off-the-run and on-the-run bonds using 
durations within narrow ranges over the sample period 10/1982-12/1988, and finds a 
consistent, positive and significant yield differential between them of 55 basis points per 
annum. 
 
Krishnamurthy (2002) studies the price difference between the on-the-run and the most 
recent off-the-run 30-year bond.  The price difference follows a systematic pattern over 
the auction cycle: It is highest right after the auction date and it declines to a small spread 
by the following auction date.  To test whether the old bond-new bond yield difference 
results from a demand for liquid assets, Krishnamurthy regresses it on the yield spread 
between commercial paper and Treasury bills (both for three months), which represent 
demand for liquidity since commercial paper is less liquid than bills.  Studying all 30-
year bond auctions in the 1990s, he finds that the yield difference increases when the 
yield spread between commercial paper and bills increases, and that the relation is 
stronger far from an auction date, when the liquidity demand is strongest.  
 
Further, Treasury bonds are often “on special” in the repo market which means that an 
owner can earn a “lending fee” by lending his bond to a short seller who must pay this 
fee. Krishnamurthy finds that new Treasury bonds are more special than old bonds. 
Hence, owners of new Treasury bonds can earn larger lending fees, which provides a 
partial explaination for why new bonds are more expensive (i.e. have lower yields). The 
differences in pricing, liquidity, and repo specialness between new and old bonds are 
consistent with the theories of Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002) and Vayanos and 
Weill (2005) as described in Section 2.8.3.  
 
Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2003) study the varying value of liquidity over time, 
analyzing the liquidity and yields of two-year U.S. Treasury notes, comparing the very 
liquid on-the-run note with the most recent off-the-run note over the entire on/off-the-run 
cycle between the issue of the bond and the issue of the next bond.  While the note is 
very liquid after issue and its buyer can expect to sell it to another buyer who will pay a 
premium for its liquidity, a buyer towards the end of the cycle may expect to sell the note 
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when it goes off-the-run and becomes less liquid.  Correspondingly, the yield difference 
between the off-the-run and the on-the-run notes decreases during the on-the-run cycle 
and approaches zero by the end of the cycle.   Thus, the yield difference is driven by 
differences in expected future liquidity, rather than contemporaneous liquidity, where 
future liquidity is estimated by the average liquidity over the remainder of the cycle. 
 
Goldreich et al. use GovPX data for 1/1994-12/2000, resulting in 56 two-year notes that 
were issued and matured through the period.  The average yield difference between the 
on-the-run and off-the-run notes (adjusting for differences in the coupon rate and the 
yield curve) is about 1.5 basis point at the beginning of the cycle and it declines to zero 
by the end of the month.   The liquidity variables that they consider are the quoted and 
effective bid-ask spread, the quote and trade size, the number of quotes and trades per 
day and the daily trading volume.  The contemporaneous value of each such variable, 
denoted C, is Ct, and the expected future value is tC = (Ct+1+Ct+2+…+CT)/(T-(t+1)), 
obtained by averaging the future values of the variable over the remaining life of the 
security (t = t+1, t+2,…,T).  Goldreich et al. find that the difference in future liquidity, 
tontoff CC ,, − , has strong explanatory power for the yield differential.  When they consider 
both the contemporaneous and future liquidity variables jointly, future liquidity 
dominates.  Finally, they find that the best explanatory liquidity variables are the quoted 
bid-ask spread and the quoted depth. 
 
In Japan, an old government bond issue is effectively made to be on-the-run by 
designating it as the benchmark bond.  It usually has a coupon similar to the coupon rate 
on newly-issued bonds and has large size, and following the designation, the benchmark 
bond becomes very liquid.  Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991) find that the yield on 
benchmark bonds is lower by about 30 to 100 basis points than the yield on bond issues 
with similar maturities and coupons, suggesting a sizable liquidity premium, especially in 
light of the fact that the average maturity of the benchmark bonds was 9.7 years over 
their study period. 
 
Elton and Green (1998) examine the effect of liquidity on Treasury securities, where 
liquidity is measured by the trading volume in the interdealer market, obtained from the 
GovPX database for the period 1/1991-9/1995.  Controlling for the tax type of the 
securities, they find significant differences between similar-maturity bonds that differ in 
their trading volumes.  The difference between the price of a low-volume bond and the 
weighted average of a pair of high-volume bond with the same maturity but different 
coupons is negative and highly significant, meaning that the low-volume bond is cheaper 
and has a higher yield to maturity.  However, their estimated price differential due to the 
liquidity difference for a sample of new bonds is small, 5 cents per $100 face value, and 
it is smaller for a sample of old bonds.  In another test of the liquidity effect, Elton and 
Green fit a cubic spline price model to the after tax term structure, using the variable 
log(volume) to represent the bond’s liquidity.  The coefficient of this term is mostly 
positive, implying a higher price for more liquid bonds.  The liquidity effect is small, 
though, amounting to 2.25 basis points, and it has been declining over the sample period.  
Notably, even after controlling for the liquidity effect (using the volume variable), there 
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is a positive and significant price deviation for on-the-run bonds, perhaps reflecting an 
aspect of liquidity of these bonds not captured by volume such as repo specialness. 
 
Longstaff (2004) provides another test of the effect of liquidity on bond yields by 
comparing yields on U.S. Treasury bonds with those on bonds issued by the Resolution 
Funding Corporation (Refcorp), a government agency. These bonds are effectively 
guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury and have the same default-free status as Treasury bonds.  
The difference between these bonds and Treasuries is in their liquidity: Refcorp bonds 
are less liquid than U.S. Treasury bonds.  Longstaff compares the yield differential 
between zero-coupon Treasury and Refcorp bonds and finds that the average yield 
premium on Refcorp bonds ranges from 10 to 16 basis points, the differences being 
statistically significant (period: 4/1991-3/2001).   This is a large liquidity premium 
which, for longer-term bonds, can represent 10%-15% of the value of the Treasury bond.  
There are considerable variations over time in this liquidity premium.  Longstaff finds 
that it is negatively related to consumer confidence and to the change in the BBB-AAA 
credit spread, and positively related to Treasury buybacks.  This means that the liquidity 
premium reacts to varying market conditions. 
 
 
3.3.2  Corporate Bonds 
 
It has been suggested that the yield spread on corporate bonds – the yield in excess of the 
yield on Treasury bonds of the same maturity – is “too high” to be explained by default 
risk alone (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), Huang and Huang (2003)).  Given 
that corporate bonds are generally less liquid that Treasury bonds, it stands to reason that 
the yield spread reflects in part a compensation for illiquidity.  In analyzing corporate 
bonds, there is a problem of separating the risk premium from the illiquidity premium.  
Low-rated corporate bonds typically have both greater risk and lower liquidity, as is the 
case for stocks of risky and small companies.  The results on the effects of liquidity 
depend, then, on the quality of the model that controls for the bond’s risk.  
 
Fisher (1959) studies the determinants of corporate bond “risk premium” – the yield 
spread – in cross-sectional regressions for the years 1927, 1932, 1937, 1949 and 1953. 
The determinants of the yield spread are default risk – proxied by the coefficient of 
variation of the firm’s earnings, the period of solvency (the time it has been operating 
without a default) and its debt/equity ratio – and marketability, proxied by the market 
value of the firm’s outstanding publicly-traded bonds (for lack of data on volume and 
bid-ask spreads).  He finds a negative relationship between the logarithm of the risk 
premium and the marketability variable, as well as the expected signs for the variables 
proxying for default risk.  These results mean that corporate bond yields reflect both risk 
and liquidity premiums. 
 
The effect of liquidity on bond yields, using explicit measures for the cost of illiquidity, 
is studied by Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2004).  They measure illiquidity in three ways.  
One is the bound around the bond price within which new information would not trigger 
a transaction, estimated from daily data by the limited dependent variable model of 
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Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999, see Section 3.2.2 above), where the information 
variables are the daily change in the ten-year risk-free interest rate and the change in the 
S&P 500 index, both scaled by the bond’s duration.  The two other measures of 
illiquidity are the quoted bid-ask spread and the percent of zero returns for a given year. 
The study examines a few thousand U.S. corporate bonds between 1995 and 2003 (the 
estimations use varying numbers of observations, depending on data availability).  As 
may be expected, lower-rated bonds are more illiquid.  Chen et al. then estimate a cross-
sectional model of the corporate yield spread as a function of the three illiquidity 
variables as well as a number of variables that control for the bond’s risk and its 
characteristics as well as the issuing firm’s characteristics.  The results show a significant 
positive effect of illiquidity on the yield spread, after controlling for the other variables 
(bond characteristics). The liquidity effect holds for both investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds, with the coefficient being larger for speculative-grade bonds.  
For example, in one estimate the authors divide the bonds in each category into three 
groups by their liquidity cost.  They find that moving from one liquidity cost to a lower 
liquidity cost increases the yield spread by 37 basis points for investment-grade bonds 
and 128 basis points for speculative-grade bonds. The study further finds in a cross-
section regression that annual changes in the bonds’ yield spread are an increasing 
function of changes in the bond’s illiquidity variables for both investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds (again, the regression controls for the changes in all other 
variables that reflect the bond and firm characteristics as well as macroeconomic factors).  
In conclusion, this study shows in a comprehensive way that the yield spread on 
corporate bonds reflects compensation for illiquidity as well as for risk.  
 
The effect of liquidity risk on corporate bond yields is studied by de Jong and Driessen 
(2005), following Pastor and Stambuagh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) (see 
section 3.2.4 above), using data from the U.S. and Europe (1/1993-2/2003).  They 
employ a two-step multifactor procedure using two market risk factors, the equity market 
index return and the change in the implied volatility of equity index options, and two 
liquidity risk factors: Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure for equity, ILLIQ, and quoted 
bid-ask spreads on long-maturity U.S. Treasury bonds.  In the first step they estimate the 
factor loadings and the liquidity betas of bond portfolios, aggregated by credit rating and 
maturity, by regressing the excess bond returns (over appropriate government bonds) on 
the market factors and the liquidity factor.  The liquidity beta here is similar to the 
liquidity exposure coefficient in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and to βL2 in Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005).  They find that lower-rated and longer-maturity bonds have greater 
exposure to the two indices of liquidity as well as greater exposure to the equity and risk 
factors.  In the second step, they estimate whether the liquidity betas are priced by 
estimating a cross-section regression of the expected bond returns on the liquidity betas 
obtained from the first step, pegging the equity risk premium at some reasonable level.  
The two resulting liquidity exposures for their U.S. bond portfolios are highly correlated, 
but both are priced in the returns on corporate bonds.  That is, corporate bonds with a 
higher exposure to stock and bond market illiquidity have higher expected returns.  For 
the U.S. market, the total estimated liquidity premium is around 45 basis points for long-
maturity investment grade bonds.  For speculative grade bonds, which have higher 
exposures to the liquidity factors, the liquidity premium is around 100 basis points.  The 
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results for a sample of European corporate bonds are similar in spirit but insignificant in 
the cross-section analysis, perhaps due to small sample limitations (there are only 7 bond 
portfolios). 
 
 
3.3.3 Rule 144A Bonds 
 
Some corporate bonds are traded in restricted markets.  Rule 144A, approved by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on April 1990, allows firms to raise capital 
from “Qualified Institutional Buyers” (QIBs) without requiring registration of the 
securities and compliance with U.S. disclosure rules.  The rule thus restricts trading in 
these securities to a purely-institutional market.  Most of the securities issued under Rule 
144A are corporate bonds.  If liquidity affect asset prices, the yield spread (relative to 
Treasuries) on bonds that trade on Rule 144A markets should be higher than on bonds  
that trade on public markets.  This is because public markets are more transparent and 
subject to disclosure rules that reduce informational asymmetries and increase liquidity.           
 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) study the impact of Rule 144A on the cost of debt for 
international firms (1991-1997).  They find, in a pooled cross-section regression of the 
yield spread on the Rule 144A dummy variable, as well as bond characteristics as 
controls, that Rule 144A bonds require a yield premium of 49 basis points on average.  
This pattern holds particularly for investment grade bonds. 
 
Fenn (2000) too examines the difference between the yield spreads on bonds traded in the 
private and public markets.  He posits that the yield differential declines over time, thus 
adding in his model an interaction variable, the product of a Rule 144A dummy variable 
and a time trend.  He finds that the coefficient on the Rule 144A dummy variable is 
positive and significant (33 to 41 basis points, depending on specification), but the 
interaction variable is negative and significant (–8 basis points a year).  However, 
Livingston and Zhou (2002), who study a later time period, find that the yield premium is 
strong and persistent, and Fenn’s results are not robust to model specification.   
Livingston and Zhou estimate the yield differential between Rule 144A bonds and 
publicly-traded bonds, controlling for a number of variables: the first time the firm issued 
debt, the (log of) its issuing frequency, bond ratings, maturity, call protection, the default 
risk premium and indicators for senior debt and utility firms.  They obtain that Rule 144A 
bonds have a higher yield, and dividing the sample by credit rating they obtain a yield 
differential of 35 basis points for the high-yield sample and 14 basis points for the 
investment grade sample.  This is consistent with the notion that moving from the private 
to the public markets is a bigger step for high-yield than for investment-grade bonds, 
which is consequently worth more.   
 
One may wonder why firms choose to issue less liquid debt under Rule 144A and incur 
the associated illiquidity cost.  Fenn (2000) concludes that Rule 144A serves as a quick 
and convenient vehicle en route to issuing public securities: Rather than incur the delay 
of registering the securities with the SEC, firms sell them first to sophisticated investors 
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who do not require registration, and after collecting the proceeds, they get to work at 
their leisure on registering the securities so they can be publicly traded.  
 
 
 
3.4  Other Financial Instruments  
 
In addition to stocks and bonds, liquidity affects the expected returns on other financial 
assets.  In what follows, we discuss the effect of liquidity illiquid options, index-linked 
bonds, American Depository Receipts, hedge funds and closed-end funds.  In each case, 
the price or expected return of the asset under study is compared to a benchmark asset 
with different liquidity, and the differences show the magnitude of the illiquidity discount 
and its determinants.    
 
3.4.1  Illiquid Options 
 
The effect of liquidity on option prices is unclear.  The buyer and the seller may each 
demand a liquidity premium, but since the option value sums to zero between the two 
parties, it is unclear that the equilibrium price would reflect any liquidity premium.  
However, if the seller (writer) of the option does not demand a liquidity premium, the 
equilibrium price may reflect the liquidity premium demanded by the buyer.  In Israel, 
the Bank of Israel issues European call options on the U.S. dollar paid in NIS (the Israeli 
currency), which are non-negotiable.  Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001) compare these 
options to ordinary options traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange that are similar in 
their payoff but differ in their liquidity, the latter being far more liquid than the former.  
Brenner et al. compare the prices of three- and six-month at-the-money-forward options 
auctioned by the Bank of Israel, which are illiquid, to the same-day prices of synthetic 
publicly-traded options with a similar strike price and expiration date that they generate 
using the liquid options (period: 4/1994-6/1997, 272 and 127 options of 3 and 6 months, 
respectively).  Because of the limited number of strike prices and expiration dates, it is 
impossible to exactly replicate the illiquid Bank of Israel option, and emulating its 
performance using publicly-traded option contracts entails transaction costs that total 
about 12%.   They propose that the price (option premium) of the (synthetic) liquid 
option should be higher than the price of the illiquid option issued by the Bank of Israel.  
They find that the illiquid Bank of Israel option trades at a mean discount of 18% to 21% 
to the liquid (synthetic) option, highly significant.39  The results are virtually unchanged 
when the estimation is performed separately for three- and six-month options. As the 
transaction costs to replicate the position have declined so did, later in time, the liquidity 
premium. 
 
Empirical asset-pricing puzzles related to options are that index options are “expensive” 
(i.e. have high implied volatility relative to actual volatility), especially out-of-the-money 
put options, and that individual stock options are priced differently (i.e., are inexpensive 
and have less steep smile curves). Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2004) address 
                                                          
39 There is a range of discounts because they use three different methods to create the synthetic option.  
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these puzzles using a model of demand pressure in which market makers can only hedge 
imperfectly. They show empirically that “end users” of options are net long index 
options, especially out-of-the-money puts, and net short individual stock options, and –
employing the model – these demand pressures can help explain the option pricing 
puzzles. Equivalently, market makers are net short index volatility and net long 
individual stock options, and they want to be compensated for the risks associated with 
these positions, which helps explain the puzzles. Also, Bollen and Whaley (2004) show 
that signed order flow in options markets is related to changes in implied volatility, again 
reflecting market makers’ inability to perfectly absorb demand pressures, and discuss the 
option-pricing implications.  
 
 
3.4.2  Index-Linked Bonds 
 
Dimson and Hanke (2002) test the existence of a liquidity effect by comparing 
instruments with similar cash flows that differ only in their liquidity.  They analyze 
equity index-linked bonds which provide the same payoff as an investment in an equity 
index40 but have finite (typically 10-15 year) maturities and their trading volume and 
transaction frequencies are low, i.e., they have low liquidity.    Because they are issued in 
small quantities and are immediately repayable if the asset cover drops below a pre-
specified level, their default risk is very low.  Dimson and Hanke use transaction data for 
all equity index-linked bonds traded on the London Stock Exchange for their entire 
history (through 2001).  They find that the prices of these bonds is discounted by an 
average of 2.71% relative to their underlying value, with the discount being an increasing 
function of these bonds’ bid-ask spread.  Using the time series of the discounts, they 
show that liquidity risk has a systematic component, and relate this market-wide factor to 
a number of macroeconomic variables that have previously been shown to be related (at 
least partially) to illiquidity: The small-firm premium and the changes in closed-end fund 
discounts, the bond maturity premium, U.S. stock market turnover, credit spread over 
Treasuries and futures basis for the FTSE 100 contract. 
 
 
3.4.3 American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
 
ADRs (American Depository Receipts) enable to compare two identical securities with 
the same payoffs but with different liquidity.  ADRs are negotiable certificates of 
ownership of shares for foreign securities which may be listed on a U.S. stock market. 
They entitle the holders to the same cash flows as does the underlying stock in the 
foreign country but due to the difference in their trading venue, there may be a difference 
between the liquidity of the ADR and of its underlying stock.  
 
                                                          
40 Equity-linked index bonds have a principal that is linked to an equity market index and a coupon that 
equals the dividend yield of the underlying equity index.  At maturity, investors receive a payment equal to 
the level of the index. 
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Chan, Hong and Subrahmanyam (2005) study 401 pairs of ADRs and underlying stocks, 
relating the price difference between them to differences in their liquidity.41  The study 
uses ADRs that were listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock 
Exchange or the NASDAQ stock market from 23 countries for the period 1981-2003.42 
They propose that the ADR premium – the price differential relative to the underlying 
stock’s price (all converted to U.S. dollars) – is an increasing function of the ADR 
liquidity in the U.S. market and a decining function of the liquidity of the underlying 
stock and of the liquidity of the market in the foreign country.  The study employs three 
liquidity measures: (i) Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ (see Section 3.2.1 above), (ii) the 
security’s turnover (the ratio of volume to shares outstanding), and (iii) the trading 
infrequency (the percentage of days on which the security did not trade over the month).  
The measures are calculated for each ADR for each month, and the first two measures are 
also calculated for the underlying stock and for the home country by averaging each over 
the stocks from each country (trading frequency did not vary for the underlying stocks in 
their home country because these stocks were frequently traded). 
 
Chan et al. estimate cross-sectional monthly regressions of the ADR premium over the 
different liquidity measures, and calculate the coefficients by the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
method.  The results support the hypothesis of a positive price-liquidity relationship.  The 
coefficients of the ADR premium on ADR liquidity (illiquidity) are positive (negative) 
and significant for all three measures.  The coefficient of the underlying stock’s ILLIQ is 
positive and significant, and that of the underlying stock’s turnover is negative and 
significant – again, consistent with the hypothesis that liquidity is priced.  These results 
are robust and continue to hold with controls for the ADR size, 1- and 6-month home 
stock market return, and 1- and 6-month exchange rate returns.  The home country’s 
ILLIQ has the expected sign but with lower explanatory power, and it is statistically 
insignificant in some models.  In summary, the liquidity of the ADR vis-à-vis the 
underlying stock appears to be an important driver of the ADR premium.   The effect of 
the ADR’s illiquidity on its premium continue to hold in a cross-sectional regression of 
the monthly changes in these variables, particularly for the turnover and trading 
frequency measures; changes in the underlying stock’s liquidity, as well as in the home 
country’s liquidity, are insignificant.   
 
3.4.4  Hedge Funds 
 
Hedge funds are private investment partnerships which can follow flexible investment 
strategies, take both long and short positions, use leverage and derivatives and invest in a 
variety of assets and markets.  Liang (1999) studies how hedge fund characteristics affect 
their returns using a sample of 385 hedge funds that reported monthly returns over the 
1/1994– 12/1996 period.  One of his explanatory variables is the fund lockup period, the 
                                                          
41 See also Rabinovitch, Silva and Susmel (2003) on the relationship between ADR liquidity and returns on 
ADRs versus the return on the underlying stocks. 
42 Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show that foreign firms that cross-list their shares as ADRs earn on average 
cumulative abnormal returns of 19% during the year before listing, and an additional 1.2% during the 
listing week, of which they lose 14% in the year following listing.  They focus, however, on Merton’s 
(1987) investor recognition hypothesis.     
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number of days since the initial investment the investor’s shares are “locked up” and 
cannot be redeemed, which constrains the investors’ liquidity (other fund characteristics 
included in his regressions are the fund’s incentive fee, management fee, log(assets) and 
age since the fund’s inception).  While most funds in the sample did not have a lockup 
period, the mean lockup period across all funds (including the zeros) was 84 days, with a 
standard deviation of 164 days.43  The results show that the coefficient of monthly return 
on the lockup period is positive and significant, consistent with a positive liquidity 
premium.  Liang concludes that “the lockup period is critical in determining fund 
returns” (p. 78). 
 
In a comprehensive analysis of the effects of liquidity on hedge fund returns, Aragon 
(2004) studies the relationship between the liquidation restrictions on hedge funds and 
their returns.  The study considers two liquidity variables: (i) the lockup provision, 
indicated by a lockup dummy (the lockup period is usually the same, around one year), 
which applies to 18% of the funds, and (ii) the fund’s redemption notice period, which is 
the number of days investors are required to give advance notice before redeeming their 
shares.  The redemption period averages 26 days across the entire sample (28% of sample 
funds do not have an advance notice requirement).  The study uses monthly data from the 
TASS Tremont database for 2,871 hedge funds over the period 1/1994-12/2001. 
 
Aragon finds that the annual return on a portfolio of funds with lockup provisions is 
higher than the return on a portfolio of funds without such provision (within a multifactor 
model).  The difference is 7%-8% for equally-weighted portfolios and 4%-5% for value-
weighted portfolios.44  In a pooled time-series and cross-section factor model of the 
monthly returns as a function of the lockup dummy and the notice period as well as the 
minimum investment size, the coefficients of both liquidity variables are positive and 
significant.  The coefficient of the lockup dummy is 6.2%-7.6%, and the excess annual 
return associated with the notice period is about 2% per month of advance notice.  After 
controlling for these variables, the constant coefficients are not statistically different from 
zero.  That is, the excess returns on hedge funds may be fully attributable to the special 
liquidation restrictions that they impose.  As a further test of the theory, Aragon (2004) 
estimates the pooled regression with quadratic forms for the notice period and minimum 
investment variables.  Because of the clientele effect discussed in Section 2.3, expected 
return should be a concave function of illiquidity, suggesting a negative coefficient of the 
squared illiquidity variables.  The results show that the coefficients on the squared 
illiquidity variables are indeed negative and significant, again confirming the theoretical 
predictions.45   
 
                                                          
43 The lockup periods for funds that have them are generally around a year.  Liang’s (1999) statistics are 
consistent with about a quarter of the funds having a lockup period around one year, and about three 
quarters of the funds having no lockup period.   
44 Aragon (2004) explains the return difference between equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios 
by the dependence on fund age. 
45 Aragon obtains similar results when he uses a two-pass approach which first estimates the multifactor 
model for each fund separately, and then uses a cross sectional regression with the fund’s α as the 
dependent variable and the above variables as independent variables. 
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3.4.5 Closed-End Funds 
 
Closed-end funds, unlike their open-end counterparts, have a fixed number of shares, 
they trade like ordinary stocks and are priced in the market.  Funds that hold domestic 
securities typically trade at a discount to their net asset value, or a negative premium, 
where the premium is the excess value of the fund’s price over its NAV (net asset value).  
The negative premium is typically explained by investor sentiment and other behavioral 
factors, or by a capitalization of the management fee.  Another explanation is the 
difference between the liquidity of closed-end funds and that of their underlying 
securities. Then, liquidity differences across funds between the liquidity of the fund’s 
stock and the liquidity of the stocks in its portfolio may explain differences in fund 
premiums. 
 
Datar (2001) studies the impact of market liquidity on the premium (= fund’s price/NAV 
–1) on closed-end funds, based on the relationship between the liquidity of the fund’s 
shares and the liquidity of the assets held in the fund’s portfolio.  He tests the hypothesis 
that within a group of funds that hold similar assets (stocks or bonds), the closed-end 
fund premium increases as the liquidity of the funds’ shares increases.  Using weekly 
data for closed-end funds listed on the NYSE,  Datar tests this hypothesis and indeed 
finds the expected positive relationship between the fund premium and the liquidity of 
the funds’ shares.  As liquidity measures, Datar uses (the logarithms of) the funds’ share 
and dollar trading volumes, shares outstanding and fund size, turnover and volatility.  
Using a number of alternative specifications, he shows the results are robust.  The results 
thus support the liquidity explanation for the closed-end fund discount.  
 
Manzler (2004) shows that the discounts on closed-end funds are driven by both liquidity 
and liquidity risk differentials between the fund stocks and the stocks in the underlying 
portfolio.  First, he calculates the portfolio liquidity—the value-weighted average of the 
liquidity of its component stocks—and the liquidity of the fund’s shares using two 
measures, a modified ILLIQ measure and the quoted bid-ask spread.  The study spans the 
1995-2003 period, where data on the portfolios of 37 funds were compiled from quarterly 
reports.  Manzler finds that the closed-end fund premium increases (or its discount 
decreases) in the difference between the illiquidity on the fund’s portfolio and the 
illiquidity of the fund’s shares (the results are significant only when using ILLIQ).  
 
Next, Manzler proposes that as the liquidity risk of closed-end funds increases relative to 
the liquidity risk of their portfolios, the fund premium should be lower (or the discount 
greater).  To that end, he constructs an illiquidity factor, the return series on illiquid-
minus-liquid (IML) stocks, obtained by ranking stocks into deciles by the magnitude of 
the residuals from an AR(2) model of their ILLIQ measure and then taking the difference 
between the returns on the extreme portfolios.  He then regresses the returns on the funds 
and their NAV on a three-factor Fama-French model that has an additional illiquidity 
factor, IML.  Finally, the average three-year premia are regressed across funds on the 
differences between the fund betas and the underlying portfolio betas.  Focusing on the 
IML betas, the results are that the fund premium declines in the difference between the 
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fund’s illiquidity beta and the illiquidity beta of its portfolio.  That is, the higher the 
liquidity risk of a closed-end fund relative to its underlying portfolio, the larger the 
closed-end fund discount. 
 
Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton (2005) develop a liquidity-based model of closed-end funds 
that shows they provide investors a way to buy illiquid securities at lower illiquidity 
costs.  Their model predicts that closed-end fund IPOs take place in waves, a sector at a 
time, with the fund share initially issued at a premium to net asset value that often turns 
later into a discount.  They show, using Morningstar data over the 1986-2004 period, that 
the behavior of closed-end fund premiums generally conforms with the predictions of 
their model.  Empirically, they find that in a time series regression of the closed-end fund 
premium on the Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure, the coefficient is negative, 
suggesting that closed-end funds are more valuable when market liquidity worsens. 
 
Liquidity differences are accentuated for closed-end country funds which issue shares in 
the U.S. and invest the proceeds in the shares of companies in a foreign country or 
region.  Unlike domestic funds, country funds tend to have positive fund premiums which 
vary substantially over time and across countries.  Similar to the case of ADRs, closed-
end country funds enable to test the liquidity effect, in this case—the relationship 
between liquidity differences and fund premiums.  This task is undertaken by Chan, Jain 
and Xia (2005), who study a sample of 41 single-country closed end funds from 29 
different countries that traded in the U.S. over the 8/1987-12/2001 period. The hypothesis 
is that if the home and U.S. market are segmented, lower home market liquidity should 
decrease only the NAV, which will increase the fund premium, whereas lower liquidity 
in the U.S. market should reduce only the fund’s price, thereby decreasing the fund 
premium.  In an integrated market, however, where liquidity shocks in one market spill 
over to the other market, the prices of the fund and its underlying assets should converge. 
The study distinguishes between segmented and integrated markets using the Edison-
Warnock (2003) measure of capital control.  In all, 16 funds are in integrated markets and 
26 funds in segmented markets.  The illiquidity of a country’s market is calculated using 
Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ measure: A country ILLIQ is an equally-weighted average of the 
illiquidity of all qualifying individual stocks in the representative market index for that 
market (which is usually quite broad-based).  The illiquidity measure is calculated every 
month (values are in logs).   
 
Chan et al. first estimate a pooled model with fixed fund effects where the fund premium 
is a function of the illiquidity of the U.S. market and the illiquidity of the foreign market 
as key explanatory variables, in addition to control variables (capital controls, the fund’s 
expense ratio, size, dividend yield, fund age, degree of institutional ownership, market 
returns in the U.S. and in the home market and the foreign exchange appreciation rate).  
A monthly time-series control variable is the average premium of all funds, thus 
capturing any investor sentiment effect.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis for 
the segmented markets: The fund premium declines in the U.S. market’s illiquidity and 
increases in the foreign market’s illiquidity, with the coefficients being statistically 
significant.  For the integrated market, the effect is reversed although the significance of 
the coefficients is not robust to model specification.   
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Next, a cross-sectional test regresses the monthly fund premiums on the explanatory 
variables, employing the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method.  Since the illiquidity of the U.S. 
market is constant across all funds in every month, the study uses instead the exposure of 
the fund’s premium to the U.S. market’s illiquidity, consistent with Pastor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) γ and with Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) βL2.  This is obtained as 
the beta coefficient from a regression of the fund’s premium on the U.S. illiquidity. 
(Also, the U.S. market return is replaced by the beta coefficient of the fund’s return on 
the U.S. market return.)  The U.S. liquidity beta, which is negative, has a negative and 
significant coefficient, implying that the liquidity risk is priced in the fund’s premium.  
The coefficient is larger and significant for the integrated markets funds and is 
insignificant for the segmented markets funds.  Country illiquidity has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the segmented markets funds, and it is 
insignificantly different from zero for the integrated markets funds.  In sum, Chan et al. 
conclude that the premiums on closed-end country funds are largely explained by 
illiquidity considerations: Their empirical results show that market illiquidity accounts 
for 35% of the time-series and 12% of the cross-sectional variation in fund premiums.   
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